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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

Case No. 17621

JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a
corporation, and AETNA
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen for
damages against the Defendant John Clay and Company for the
willful, malicious and outrageous breach of contract by said
Defendant.

Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company is the

surety for Defendant John Clay and Company pursuant to a bond
required by the Packers and Stockyards Act administered by the
Department of Agriculture, and is thereby liable to the extent
of its bond ($75,000).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On June 30, 1980, following a lengthy jury trial before the
Honorable Don

v.

Tibbs, District Judge, the jury returned a

verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant for
general damages of $191,463.40 and one dollar punitive

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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damages.

(Verdict, R.

130)

The jury also found in the

Plaintiff's favor and against Defendant .John Clay on its
Counterclaim.

(R. 131)

The Judgment on the Verdict was

entered by the trial court on July 8, 1980,

for $191,464.40,

"together with interest on all of said Judgment as shall
hereafter be determined by the Court."

The Judgment further

provided that "Pursuant to the Pretrial Order, the amount of
interest,

if any,

attorneys'

and whether Plaintiff is entitled to

fees and,

if so,

the amount thereof are reserved for

future determination by the Court."
Appendix A,

(Judgment,

R. 136-37,

attached hereto)

On November 7, 1980, Defendants' appeal to this Court was
dismissed,
final

sua sponte, because it was not an appeal from a

judgment.

The matter was remitted to the trial court for

the determination of the questions of interest and attorneys'
fees.

(Remittitur, R. 154)

Following consideration of lengthy memoranda, oral
arguments of counsel and the Defendants' objections, the trial
court awarded Plaintiff a reasonable attorneys' fee and
interest.

The Court entered Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law,

finding that "the conduct of the Defendant

John Clay and Company and its officers and employees was
willful, malicious and oppressive as found by the jury."
(Amended Findings,

R.

216-18,

Appendix B, attached hereto)

·
·
an Amended Supplemental Judgment
Pursuant to its Findings,
was entered on February 24, 1981, awarding Plaintiff' in

-2-
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I

addition to the jury's verdict, the sum of $21,400.00 as a
attorneys'

~easonable

fee.

The Plaintiff was also awarded

prejudgment interest at six percent per annum, totaling
$14,822.37; and interest after the Judgment on the Verdict at
eight percent, totaling $9,087.21.
.Judgment,

(Amended Supplemental

R. 214-15, attached as Appendix C)

Defen<lants then

appealed to this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance in their entirety of
the jury's verdict, the Judgment entered thereon and the
Amended Supplemental Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent refers to the trial record as follows:
Trial transcript as "Tr.--;"
Court file as "R.--;"
Trial exhibits as "Exh.--."
While Appellants' Statement of Facts is generally accurate,
it is incomplete and omits substantial evidence, presumably in
order to avoid the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence
supporting the judgment against Appellants.

Appellants also

state as "fact" testimony favorable only to their contentions
~n appeal.

Therefore, Respondent provides the following

comprehensive Statement of Facts:
The Parties
Plaintiff-Respondent Neil Jorgensen is a sheep
rancher-farmer residing in Mount Pleasant, Sanpete County,
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Utah.

He has been in the sheep business under the name of the

Skyline Sheep Company for 25 years, having raised and sold
lambs for over ten years.

In the fall of 1978, Mr. Jorgensen

had purchased and/or raised 18,000 lambs to be marketed.

('1'r.

49-51, 54)
Defendant-Appellant .John Clay and Company (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as "John Clay" or "Defendant") is a
closely-held Utah corporation doing business as a livestock
dealer.

While it has an office in Ogden, Weber County, Utah,

it conducts its business of buying and selling sheep and other
livestock throughout the western states.

(Tr. 697)

As

particularly described herein, virtually all of the
transactions in the instant dispute occurred in Arizona,
California, Colorado or Sanpete County, Utah.
100-106, 293, 297,

311,

(Tr.

70,

323, 328, 694-95)

John Clay purchases and markets approximately one-half
million lambs each year to the major meat packing houses.
342, 697-98, 726)

Irr.

It estimates an average profit of sixty

cents for each lamb it markets.

(Tr. 342-43)

In 1979, it sold

250,000 lambs (valued at over $16,000,000.00) to Monfort
Company of Colorado, a processor with plants in Colorado and
Texas.

(Tr.

696)

Officers and stockholders of John Clay are

Raymond (Rink) Williams and Frank Rynders.

(Tr. 694-95)

Leon

Sparrow is a sheep "salesman and buyer" for the company under
Williams' direction.

During the marketing season, Sparrow

lives in and works out of Yuma, Arizona.

(Tr. 78, 28S,

704; Exh. 12A) Williams resides in Phoenix, Arizona.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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323

'

(Tr, 694'

In the sheep industry, lambs born in the preceding winter
or spring are fed on summer range.

Mr. Jorgensen's lambs which

are not ready for market in the fall are sent to pastures or
feedlots near Blythe, California, or
called "feeder lambs."
ready for market,
(Tr. 52-55)

~rizona.

These lambs are

Later, when they become "fat" and are

they are generally termed "old crop lambs."

The fat lambs are sold by Mr. Jorgensen either to

a middleman livestock dealer such as John Clay and Company or
directly to the packing house.

(Tr. 51-55)

The price of the

lambs is determined by their weight and time of delivery.

The

price of the lambs may be discounted by a "weight stop" when a
buyer does not want to pay for weight above a certain minimum
(e.g.,

120 pounds).

Such practice is disapproved by the

Packers and Stockyards Administration as an unfair trade
practice.

(Tr. 557-58, 686-68; App. E, PP• 4-5)

The Contract
In December, 1978, Leon Sparrow, Defendant's lamb buyer,
contacted the Plaintiff in Mount Pleasant to see if the latter
would sell another 10,000 lambs to John Clay and Company.

ITr.

63-64) Sparrow had already come to Jorgensen in Mount Pleasant
the previous month and entered into a written contract with
Plaintiff to purchase 5,000 of Plaintiff's lambs at 65c per
pound with a "120-pound weight stop."

(Tr. 60, 298, 345-47,

685-88; Exh. 16) sparrow had already arranged to sell these
lambs to Monfort for 65.50C per pound.

(Tr. 348)

At this time

most of Plaintiff's 18,000 lambs were on feed in Blythe,
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California, with some loads in Cedar City and Mount Pleasant,
Utah.

(Tr. 65,

292)

'
On December 13, 1978, in Mount Pleasant, Plaintiff
receive: i

from Sparrow and signed a contract to sell to John Clay 10 ,ooo
"old crop lambs" at 70¢ per pound with no weight stop.
l;

R.

24)

(Exh.

The contract, prepared by Sparrow, states in part:

I

The lambs are on pasture in Blythe, California Area. They
are to be sorted at Daylight the morning of Del., loaded oi
trucks & weighed on the trucks at nearest scale. delivery '
to be F.O.B. truck.
Balance of Purchase Price shall be paid when livestock are
loaded on cars.
(Exh. 1, Appendix D, attached hereto)
As an "amendment" to the 5,000 head (65e) contract, a
further clause was inserted that "4 loads to go after X-mas
from Cedar City."

(Appendix D; Tr. 65, 69, 348-49)

Thereafter, Sparrow contacted Ray Wadlington, lamb buyer
for Monfort of Colorado.

Sparrow arranged to sell the lambs to

Monfort at a price one-half cent per pound greater than the
price in John Clay's contract with Jorgensen.

(Exhs. 17, 18)

After Christmas, 1978, shipments from Blythe (and Cedar
City) began on the 65¢ contract directly to Monfort's
processing plant in Greeley, Colorado.

(Tr. 69)

Deliveries

from Blythe continued into January, 1979, until the 6Sc
contract was completed.

(Tr.

139; Exh.

14)

Plaintiff also

orally agreed to sell other lambs to John Clay at 73c per pound
with no weight stop.

( Tr. 1 36 , 1 40 , 163)

On the occasion of

each shipment, shipping dates were discussed and agreed upon in
advance of each shipment so that Plal. nt1' ff could either be
-6-
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present or have a representative present to supervise the
sorting,

loading and inspection of the lambs.

(Tr. 69, 137)

John Clay worked very closely with Monfort because it is a
major buyer of livestock from John Clay.

(Tr. 696)

Lambs sold

by the Defendant to Monfort were shipped both to Greeley,
Colorado, and San Angelo, Texas.
Rink Williams

(R. 634-35)

Leon Sparrow and

(John Clay's representatives) knew Wadlington and

Robert Quam (Monfort's head lamb buyers) and dealt with them on
a daily basis.

Sparrow was always in close daily contact with

Wadlington and other Monfort personnel, arranging shipping
dates and settling payment on other lambs, as well as Neil
Jorgnesen's.

(Tr. 393, 342-44, 600, 615, 622, 655-56, 704)

About December 30, 1978, the Plaintiff informed Leon
Sparrow that because of weather conditions in Blythe,
California, the lambs to be shipped under the 10,000 head 706
contract needed to be moved to get better feed.
discussed the weather condition in Blythe.

The parties

(Tr. 70-71)

Sparrow called Plaintiff and suggested that he move the 10,000
head to the Marvin Weber feedlot in Ault, Colorado, eleven
miles from Monfort's plant at Greeley.

(Tr. 71)

Sparrow

agreed that John Clay would reimburse Plaintiff for the freight
to Colorado since Clay was already obligated to pay for
shipment of the fat lambs from Blythe under the terms of the
written contract.

(Tr. 72-74,

352)

Sparrow also made the

arrangements with the feedlot, through Wadlington at Monfort,
where the lambs would be cared for and fed at Plaintiff's
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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expense until such time as proper delivery was to be made und,,
the contract.
delivery dates.

(Tr. 74,

352, 585-86)

No change was made in th,

John Clay still had the option to take

delivery of the lambs between January and March 15, 197'l,

!•r,

352)

Shipment of all Plaintiff's lambs from Blythe proceeded
through .January, 1979.

While Plaintiff's fat lambs were

shipped to the Monfort packing house to fi 11 the 65c contract,
the parties were also shipping the "feeder lambs"

(which were

not yet fat) to the Weber feedlot under the 10,000 lamb
contract.

(Tr. 76-77,

354-60)

The last shipment of "feeder

lambs" to Ault left Blythe on January 24, 1979.

Proper

shipping arrangements were observed and either Plaintiff or hi;
representative was present for every shipment.

(Tr.

74)

total of 9,887 lambs were received by Weber in Ault.

A

(Exh. 19!

During this period, Sparrow and Plaintiff were in daily
telephone communication between Mount Pleasant, Blythe,
California, and Yuma, Arizona.

(Tr. 74, 77-78, 369-71)

Sparrow was also in daily contact with Wadlington at Monfort.
(Tr. 344)
John Clay's Breach
While in Mount Pleasant on February 10, 1979, Mr. Jorgensen
received a phone call from Sparrow in Yuma.

(Tr. 323)

Sparrow

informed Plain ti ff that on February 5, 6 and 7 Rink Williams
and Monfort had taken 2421 of Plaintiff's lambs from the Weber
feedlot and shipped them to the Monfort plant.

(Tr. 78-
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Sparrow apologized for John Clay's failure to notify Plaintiff
of the intended delivery and promised that he would make sure
it never happened again and that Plaintiff would be notified
before any further shipments.

(Tr. 79, 143, 171, 325)

Although in daily contact with Wadlington, Sparrow claimed that
he had not been notified of any scheduled shipment.
371, 618)

ITr. 344,

Rink Williams admitted that he had known that the

lambs would be taken the first week of February but claimed it
was up to Sparrow to follow through with respect to notifying
Plaintiff of the delivery dates.

(Tr. 728-31)

Jorgensen was upset that his lambs had been taken from the
feedlot without any notice to him.

He was not acquainted with

any of the people in Colorado and wanted to see that his lambs
were handled properly.

(Tr. 81, 171)

Sparrow said that he

didn't blame Jorgensen for being upset and repeated his promise
that it would never happen again.

(Tr. 81)

Plaintiff called

Sparrow back three or four times that day to get an
understanding of the situation and to make sure it would not
happen again.

On each occasion Sparrow repeated his promise.

(Tr. 80-81, 143-44) Plaintiff also requested the weight tickets
from Sparrow for the lambs taken.

(Tr.

81)

Sparrow assured

him everything had been taken care of "properly in the usual
manner."

(Tr. 83)

The Plaintiff then called Rink Williams in Phoenix,
Arizona, and expressed dissatisfaction with John Clay's
business of shipping Plaintiff's lambs without notifying him.
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Williams replied that he would do so whenever he (Williams\ so
desired.

(Tr. 81-82, 144)

Plaintiff then called Sparrow

again, who again repeated his prior promise that they would no;
ship Plaintiff's lambs without prior notice.

(Tr. 82)

Plaintiff also called Wadlington at his home in Arizona, who
also assured Plain ti ff that no more lambs would be taken until
Plaintiff was notified.

(Tr. 84, 619, 654-55)

After these conversations, there was no doubt in the
Plaintiff's mind that John Clay and Monfort had promised to
notify Plaintiff and would so notify him before they took any
more of his lambs.

(Tr. 171)

Not only was this the practice

in all prior transactions between the parties, but advance
notice to the seller prior to shipping is clearly the accepted
custom and practice in the livestock industry.
172-73, 190-96, 202-5, 500-1, 682)

(Tr. 68-69,

See, also, 42 FR 49929,

September 28, 1977.
Later, Plain ti ff received through the mail from Sparrow a
John Clay receipt and check for the 2421 lambs taken, showing
the number and weight of the lambs as the basis for the
payment.

However, no official weight tickets were ever sent to

Plaintiff to verify the weight, nor was there any payment or
accounting for the freight from Blythe to }\.ult.

(Exhs. 3, 31\;

Tr. 84-86, 182)
The following week on February 13 and 14, Neil .Jorgensen
went to Colorado with his wife and her parents to check on thE
lambs.

They met Wadlington at the Mon fort plant.

Wadl in gt on
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1
I

again apologized for not having notified Plaintiff in advance
of delivery and assured Plaintiff he would make sure he was so

I

notified in the future.
shipment would be.

Nothing was said about when the next

The Monfort buyer was in a hurry to catch a

plane so he quickly excused himself.

(Tr. 87-88, 230, 233, 594)

Following his return to Sanpete County on February 14,
Plaintiff was in contact with Sparrow in Arizona or California
practically every day.

(Tr. 88-89)

In fact, Plaintiff

continued to sell lambs to Sparrow under various oral contracts
u

late as February 27.

(Tr. 160-62)

But contrary to the

promises made to him by John Clay and Monfort, .Jorgensen never
received any notice in advance that John Clay or Monfort (or
anyone else) wanted to take delivery of more lambs at Ault.
(Tr. 88, 121)
In the evening of February 22 or 23, Sparrow again called
from Yuma to Jorgensen,

informing him that ,Tohn Clay and

Monfort had again taken lambs from the Weber feedlot in Ault.
1

Tr. 89, 328)

Sparrow again apologized, stating he was

informed by Wadlington that 695 lambs had been shipped.
Sparrow didn't know the weights.

But

Plaintiff then called Marvin

Weber at the feedlot, who informed him that 1096 lambs had been
taken, not just 695.

(Tr. 89)

Because of confusion and uncertainty as to the number and
weight of the sheep taken, Plaintiff had to make several calls
to obtain the information.

(Tr. 276-80, 458-66)

Plaintiff

called Sparrow back, telling him what Weber had said and
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expressing dissatisfaction at the way Defendant's business was
run,

At Sparrow's suggestion, Plaintiff called Wadlington who

was in California.

Wadlington claimed that only 695 of

Jorgensen's lambs were taken.

He advised Plaintiff that if he

didn't "trust anybody" to go over to Colorado himself to check
it out.

(Tr.

89-90, 630)

Plaintiff then called the Monfort plant.

The Monfort

employee at the "lamb desk" confirmed that 1096 Jorgensen lambs
were slaughtered; but when Plaintiff asked her for the weights
on the lambs, she told him she had been ordered not to give
Plain ti ff that information,

Plaintiff stated to the employee

he woula call the Packers and Stockyards Administration, if
necessary, to get the information.

(Tr. 95-96, 176-80, 261)

Plaintiff also called Marvin Weber again, who informed him
another shipment was scheduled for the next morning.

Plaintiff

told Weber to wait until (he) 01aintiff arrived on the first
plane in the morning before releasing any more lambs.

When it

appeared that Plaintiff could not fly to Ault because of ba1
weather, he called Weber and told him to go ahead and ship the
load if necessary.

Weber replied that they had already

substituted another's lambs and there would be no problem.
(Tr. 91, 134, 428-29, 466, 472)

Although approximately 6300 of

Plaintiff's lambs remained in Weber's feedlot, neither
Plaintiff nor the feedlot ever received any further order or
request from John Clay or Monfort to ship more Jorgensen
lambs.

(Tr. 121, 134, 473, 566)
-12-
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Plaintiff again received a check from Sparrow for the
second taking, but no official weight slips were given as
(Exhs. 4, 4A; Tr. 92-94, 558)

required by law.

Plaintiff

later learned that on each occasion John Clay and Monfort had
obtained the weight of the sheep by loading and weighing each
shipment contrary to the contract and the accepted custom and
practice in the industry.
354, 609, 752-55)

(Tr. 131, 133-34, 175-176, 191-92,

Furthermore, without any excuse and in

violation of the contract and government regulation, the lambs
had not been weighed on the "nearest public scale," even
through a public scale was located only a block from the truck
route to the Monfort plant.

(Tr. 175, 385, 553-56, 577, 579)

On February 27, 1979, in Blythe, California, Plaintiff and
Leon Sparrow agreed that Plaintiff's last 274 fat lambs in
Blythe would be delivered as part of the 70c per pound
contract.

(Tr. 97-98, 214)

timely payment for them.

But Defendant failed to make any

(Tr. 369-70)

Sparrow also told

Plaintiff that they wanted to resume deliveries from Ault under
the 10,000 lamb contract the following Monday, March 5, 1979.
Plaintiff stated he would be there.

(Tr. 99, 217)

However, on Saturday, March 3, 1979, Sparrow called
Jorgensen and told him that John Clay would not accept any more
of Plaintiff's lambs because Monfort would not take them.
100, 391,

566)

(Tr.

Sparrow admitted that he felt .Tohn Clay still

had a contract with Jorgensen and was obligated to take the
lambs.

But, Sparrow said, there was nothing he could do.
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Sparrow did not give any reason other than that Rink Williams
had refused to take Jorgensen's lambs.

(Tr. 100, 391-92)

By

this time, the market price for lambs had dropped to 60c per
pound.

(Tr. 580)

Plaintiff and Sparrow went to Greeley, Colorado, to "su
what might be done."

(Tr. 391)

In a meeting with Bob Quam,

Monfort's head buyer, on Tuesday, March 6, 1981, Quam simply
stated he would not take the lambs; that his deal was not with
Jorgensen but with John Clay.

(Tr. 103,

Sparrow admitted to Plaintiff,

"It looks to me like,

249-51)

Later,
in my

opinion, that John Clay will have to pay you for the lambs.
(Tr.

104,

258)

Rink Williams and Frank Rynders arrived in Ault on
Thursday, March 8, at Sparrow's request, and met with Sparrow
and Plaintiff.

(Tr. 103)

Williams claimed the situation was

out of Defendant's hands and wasn't its responsibility.

No

reason was given for not accepting the lambs.

He

( R.

255)

"offered" to help Plaintiff resell the lambs for considerably
less money.

(Tr.

106)

T"1hen requested by Plaintiff to honor

the contract, Williams threateningly retorted,

"

• if you

plan on being in the feeding business, my advice is for you to
take your loss now and forget it."

(Tr. 254-55, 105-6)

The following day, Williams and Rynders met privately with
Monfort and thereafter "suggested" to Plaintiff that he accept
their "offer" to take the lambs at 60c a pound with a 120-pound
weight stop, provided Plaintiff released them from all
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obligations under the contract.

Although Monfort could have

slaughtered all of Jorgensen's lambs within three days, neither
it nor John Clay would even promise to take them promptly but
would "clean them up by April 1, or attempt to."
178, 546,

(Tr. 106,

580) Plaintiff refused such a drastic change in the

contract and left to return to Sanpete County, Utah.

(Tr. 107)

Before leaving Greeley, Plaintiff contacted R. H. Rock
Company and offered to sell it the remaining lambs.

He

informed the Defendant that if it wanted to honor the contract,
to contact him by 9:00 a.m. Saturday, March 10, in Mount
Pleasant, Utah, otherwise, the lambs would be resold to Rock.
(Tr. 107-109} When the Defendant only raised its offer to 63c
per pound, Plaintiff signed the contract to sell to R. H. Rock
for the equivalent of $70.20 per head.

(Tr. 107-109; Exhs. 8,

9)

Plaintiff shipped 6283 lambs to R. H. Rock, resulting in a
loss to him of $166,566.40, plus the unpaid freight of
$22,000.00 for their transportation from Blythe, California, to
Ault, Colorado.

(Tr. 130-31; Exh. 10)

On their return from Colorado, Williams and Sparrow
discussed how much they would pay Jorgensen for the 274 lambs
delivered on February 27, payment for which was long overdue.
They determined they would pay him 65i6 per pound instead of the
previously agreed 701;.

(Tr. 737-39; Exhs. 12, 12A, 14A) After

Sparrow arrived in Yuma, he mailed to Jorgensen in Sanpete
County a check for the 274 lambs at only 656 per pound.
113, 177,

(Tr.

369-70; Exhs. 12, 12A)
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After filing a proper claim with the Defendant Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company and with the Packers and Stockyar1s
Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture,
Plaintiff brought this action for damages as a result of
Defendant's breach of contract which breach Plaintiff claims
was willfully malicious, in bad faith and with a reckless
indifference and disregard of Plaintiff's rights

unde~

contract and the custom and law regarding livestock
transactions.
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the

Summary of Argument

1.

Venue is proper in Sanpete County, Utah.

The trial court correctly determined that venue was
properly laid in Sanpete County, the county of Plaintiff's
residence.

Under Section 78-13-6, u.c.A.

(1953), where a

"transitory" cause of action has arisen outside of the state,
the plaintiff resident may bring the action in his own county.
Defendant breached the contract by taking the lambs without
notice and later refusing delivery of the lambs in Ault,
Colorado.

Even if the provisions of Section 78-13-6 are

applied, the rules, custom and trade in the livestock industry,
as well as prior dealings between the parties, regarding
payment of the purchase price necessarily implies that Sanpete
County is the place of performance in Utah.

2.

Punitive Damages and Attorneys' Fees Against Defendant

John Clay For Its Malicious and Willful Breach of Contract Were
Prop~i:_.

Punitive damages and attorneys' fees may properly be
recovered for the malicious, willful and oppressive breach of
contract by the Defendant.

The jury necessarily found that

John Clay's breach was willful and malicious.
also so found.

The trial court

There is substantial evidence in support of

these findings • .Justice and equity require that the Defendant
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bear theo consequence of its conduct outrageously contrary to
accepted ctlstom, practice and regulation and demonstrating a
callous indifference to its obligations and Plaintiff's rights
under the contract.
3.

Plaintiff was properly awarded

prejudgment~terest.

Prejudgment interest is proper when a plain ti ff' s damages
are "liquidated" or, in other words, fixed and capable of
calculation as of a certain date.

Plaintiff was properly

awarded such interest from March 24, 1979, to the date of
judgment.

On March 24, Plaintiff's damages were fixed and

capabl.e of calculation by subtracting from the amount received
upon resale the amount he would have received at 70.t per

poun~.

The verdict and judgments of the lower court should be
affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
VENUE IS PROPER IN SA..~PETE COUNTY AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in failing to
grant Defendants' Motion for change of venue to transfer this
case to Weber County.

Appellants claim this case is

necessarily controlled by Sections 78-13-4 and 78-13-7, U.C.A.

(1953), and cite various cases where these sections have been
applied by this Court.

But in asserting that these cases

should have controlled the lower court, Appellants ignore both
the facts of this case and other statutes regarding proper
venue.
The trial court did not err in determining venue is proper
in Sanpete County.

Notwithstanding Defendants' claim to a

general right to have an action tried in the county of their
"residence," "actions may be tried elsewhere when so provided
by statute."

Walker Bank and Trust Co. v.

_Wa~~~?:.·

631 P.2d 860

(Utah, 1981).
Initially, it should be noted that while Defendant Clay
claims its "principal and only place of business" is in Ogden,
Weber County (R. 12), none of the contacts or transactions
between the parties ever occurred in Weber County.

Defendant

Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, John Clay's bonding Company,
is also a foreign corporation, transacting business in this
state.

(R.l)
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I~

John Clay's business with Plaintiff took place either
outside of the State of Utah or in Sanpete County.

(Tr. 293,

297, 313, 320, 323, 328, 330-33, 337, 100-106, 178, 694; Aff.,
R. 24-25; Exh. 12A)

During the sheep season, Mr. Sparrow

in and worked out of Yuma, Arizona.

live~

(Tr. 313, 323; Exh. 1211)

Mr. Rink Williams also resides in and works out of

~rizona.

(Tr. 694)
Mr. Sparrow contacted the Plaintiff in Mount Pleasant,
Sanpete County, offering to purchase Plaintiff's lambs on feed
in Blythe, California.

Sparrow's written contracts were

entered into in Mount Pleasant, Sanpete County.
Aff.,

R. 24, 25)

(Tr . 60, 287:

Other lambs owned by Plain ti ff were purchased

by and delivered to Defendant in Blythe, California, and in
Sanpete County.

(Tr. 292, 296-97)

The 10,000 lamb contract (App. D) specifically provides
that the sheep are on pasture at Blythe, California, to be
sorted and loaded there--"delivery to be £.o.b. truck" at whic~
time they were to be paid for.

(App. D; R. 25) These lambs

were later transported from Blythe, California, to Ault,
Colorado, pursuant to the parties' oral agreement.

(Tr. 352)

While in Ault, Colorado, ,John Clay and Monfort repeatedly
removed the lambs from the feedlot without any notice to Mr.
Jorgensen and improperly weighed the lambs loaded on the
trucks.

(Tr. 556, 682)

Leon Sparrow called Jorgensen from

Yuma, Arizona, on each occasion to "apologize" for the failure
to notify him.

(Tr. 374-75, 380)

When the Plaintiff objecten
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to this procedure, Clay repudiated its contract by refusing
delivery of the lambs f.o.b. truck at the Ault feedlot.
391-92)

('l'r.

Plaintiff's conversations and meetings with Sparrow

and Williams of John Clay and with Monfort took place either
personally in California and Colorado or by telephone he-tween
Mount Pleasant, Arizona, Colorado and California.
101-108)

('l'r.

All payments by John Clay to Jorgensen in this and

other contracts were made by Sparrow either in California at
the time and place of delivery or by mail from Arizona to the
Plaintiff's home in Sanpete County.

(Exh. 12A: R. 25)

Nothing

relative to this contract ever transpired in Ogden, Utah.

(Tr.

70, 313, 318, 694-95)
Under Section 78-13-6, U.C.A.

(1953), this action was

properly brought by Plaintiff in the county of his residence.
Section 78-13-6 provides:
All transitory causes of action arising without this state
in favor of residents of this state shall, if action is
brought thereon in this state, be brought and tried in the
county where the plaintiff resides, or in the county where
the principal defendant resides, or if the principal
defendant is a corporation, then in the county where the
plaintiff resides or in the county where such corporation
has an office or place of business, subject, however, to a
change of venue as provided by law.
If the cause of action is transitory, has arisen outside of the

state and Plaintiff is a resident, then venue is proper in
Sanpete County, the county of Plaintiff's residence.
It is clear that the instant case is a "transitory
action."

Allen v. Allen, 47 Utah 145, 151 Pac. 982 (1915).

~lder v. Third Judicial District Cour~,

2 Utah 2d 309, 273
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P.2d 168, 171 (1954).
1011 (1898),

In Steed v. Harvey,

18 Utah 367, 54 Pac.

the Utah court held that an action to recover

damages for breach of contract for the failure to deliver
cattle in Wyoming was a transitory action.
It cannot be disputed that Plaintiff's action arose in
Colorado first when Defendant John Clay (with Monfort Company!
took 3517 lambs without any notice to Plaintiff; and later when
requested in Colorado by Plaintiff to honor the contract,
Defendant Clay refused to take or accept further deliveries,
repudiating its obligations under the contract.
105-6, 391-92,

251, 254-55, 717)

(Tr. 121,

Even Defendant's counterclab

that Plaintiff "delayed" delivery in Ault, Colorado, not in
(Aplt. Brief, p. 23)

Utah.

This action certainly cannot be

claimed to have "arisen" in Utah, and venue is controlled by
Section 78-13-6 U.C.A.
L.A.

&

(1953, as amended).

Dee v. San Pedro,

S.L.R. Co., 50 Utah 167, 167 Pac. 246 (1917); Seedling

Inc. v. King,

378 So.2d (Fla. App.,

Transportation Co. v. Ranzenberger,
(1974); State v. Circuit Court,

1979);

Brig~

299 Minn. 127, 217 NW'2d 198

221 Or. 309, 351 P.2d 39

(1960); 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, Section 37, p. 882.
Plaintiff was entitled to bring this action in the county
of his residence.

The trial court should liberally construe

the Complaint and supporting material in favor of the pleader.
In fact,

the allegations of Plaintiff's

~omplaint

and

supporting Affidavit were not disputed by the Defendants for
purposes of Defendants' Motion to change venue.

(Compl. R. ?,
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3; Aff.,

R. 24-26)

Even so, the determination of disputed

matters for the purpose of ruling on proper venue is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.

Deimler v. Ostler, 600

p,2d 814, 815 (Mont., 1979);

v. Fowler, 77

~ribolet

~riz.

59,

266 P.2d 1088 (1954); 77 Am. Jur. 2d, supra at 930.
In Dee v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 50 Utah 167, 167
Pac. 246 (1917), this Court interpreted the identical
predecessor section to Section 78-13-6, U.C.A.

(1953), and held

that the action was properly brought in the county of the
plaintiff's residence, even though the plaintiff was only an
assignee of the claim.

That claim arose from damage to

livestock being transported by the defendant railroad from Salt
Lake City to Los Angeles.

Plaintiff Dee, an assignee of the

livestock owner, Sheffor, brought the action in Weber County
for the injuries to horses while in transit in Nevada and
California.

The railroad claimed that the proper counties for

venue were either the residence of the livestock owner (Cache
County) or the "principal place" of defendant's business (Salt
Lake County).

Not only did the court indicate that these

places of venue were proper under then Section 2931Xl, Comp.
Laws Utah (1907), the court also held that venue was proper in
W£ber County, the county of the plaintiff-assignee's residence,
pursuant to the provisions of the statute.
In discussing the effect of an assignment to the plaintiff
on

the issue of proper venue, the court, in Dee, stated that if

a motion for change of venue is "based upon the ground that the
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action is brought in the wrong county, it should negative the
facts under which such county would be the proper one."
Pac. at 249)

In the instant case, as in Dee,

( 167

the Defendants

did not "negative" or deny any specific facts alleged in
Plaintiff's Complaint or his Affidavit supporting venue--e.g.,
Plain ti ff is a resident of Sanpete County ( R. 1 l; the parties
entered into their contracts in Sanpete County; the lambs were
to be delivered f.o.b. truck in Ault, Colorado;

in Ault, John

Clay repudiated the contract and refused to take delivery of
the lambs (R. 2,

25); and payment was to be made to Plaintiff

in Sanpete County (R. 25).

Defendants' response by Affidavit

was only that John Clay is a Utah corporation with its
"principal and only place of business in Ogden, Weber County,
Utah," attaching a copy of the 10,000 lamb contract.
14)

( R. 13,

The Defendants' Affidavit was not sufficient to entitle

them to have venue transferred to Weber County as a matter of
right.

It added nothing different than already stated in

Plaintiff's Complaint.

77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, Section 82, P·

930.
Affirming the statutory right of Plaintiff to bring this
action in the county of his residence does not violate any
pol icy to avoid undue expense,
Defendants.

inconvenience or disadvantage to

Although some pretrial discovery was conducted in

Salt Lake City for the convenience of both parties, the bulk of
discovery took place in Colorado.

At trial, Defendants did not

incur any significant additional expense by bringing its
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various trial witnesses from Colorado to Sanpete County than
had the trial been held in Weber County.

Moreover, Defendant's

officer, Rink Williams, presumably traveled to the trial from
his Phoenix residence--a shorter distance to Manti than to
Ogden.
Respondent submits that the evidence of Defendant's breach,
malicious and with flagrant, reckless disregard for Plaintiff's
rights, is so clear and unequivocal in the trial record that
ilie jury's verdict cannot be considered "manifestly unjust."
There is absolutely no reason to suppose that the Sanpete
County jury was unfairly impassioned or prejudiced for or
against either party.

Respondent further believes that the

legislature was fully aware that the inconvenience and
disadvantage in litigating disputes arising in foreign states
is just as great for a resident plaintiff as for a resident
defendant.

The policy to protect a party litigant from undue

inconvenience and disadvantage is the same whether plaintiff or
~fendant.

In this case, virtually all of the transactions between the
parties,

including Defendant's repeated breach, occurred

outside of the State of Utah.
arose outside of Utah.

Plaintiff's cause of action

Venue, under Section 78-14-6,

therefore proper in Sanpete County.

is

None of the cases cited by

Appellants involves such facts similar to this case.

Certain

of these cases even involved oral and not written
contracts--i.e.,

Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 61
-25-
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Utah 559, 216 Pac. 684 (1923); Olympia Sales

~~v_~,

604

P.2d 919 (Utah, 1979).
Even assuming, arguendo,
78-13-4, U.C.A.

that the provisions of Section

(1953), should be applied to the agreement

between the parties, venue is still proper in Sanpete County.
This section applies to written contracts where the place of
obligation is stated or appears by "necessary implication."
Palfreyman v. Trueman, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943).

~

noted, the contract expressly provides that Defendant is to
perform by taking delivery of the livestock at the time they
are loaded on the trucks, f .o.b.

at Blythe, California (and

later, Ault, Colorado).
Further, payment for the delivered animals must be made at
that time, either at the place of delivery or Plaintiff's
residence in Sanpete County.

"Balance of purchase price shall

be paid when livestock are loaded on cars."
payments made were made in that manner.

(App. D)

All

( R. 2 5 ; Exh . l '2A)

Plaintiff's Affidavit states that "it was the intent of the
parties

that the livestock purchased by John Clay and

Company would be paid for by mailing or delivering the purchase
price to Affiant in Sanpete County, Utah."
no evidence to the contrary.

(R.

25)

There is

Plain ti ff' s undisputed Affidavit

was properly considered by the trial court to support the
"necessary implication" that Plaintiff's residence in Sanpete
County was the place of payment in Utah.
supra, at 815.

Deimler v. Ostler,

Any question of interpretation arising from the
-26-
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language of the written contract (prepared by Sparrow) is
properly resolved in favor of Respondent and against Appellants.
Under the Federal Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as
amended (7 U.S.C., Section 181, et seq.), a "market agency" or
"dealer" (e.g., John Clay and Company) shall, upon delivery of
the livestock, deliver to the livestock seller the net proceeds
of the purchase price, with a full accounting, before the end
of the next business day.

(Tr. 370, 645)

It requires that if

the seller is not present to receive the check at the time of
delivery of the sheep, the payment must be timely mailed first
class, postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the seller.

u.s.c., Section 228b; Regs.

of Sec. of Agriculture, Packers

Stockyards Act, 9 CFR, Section 201.43.

(Pertinent parts of

the regulations are attached as Appendix E.)
As provided in Atlas Acceptance Corporation v. Pratt, 85
Utah 352, 39 P.2d 710, 714 (1935), a "necessary implication"
does not require the court to "shut out every other possible or
imaginary conclusion," but rather to take what would be a
"reasonable view," the contrary of which would be improbable.
39 P. 2d at 714.

Th is is not a case where the court has to

guess where or how the parties intended that Clay should
perform its contract.

There can be "no room to doubt" that the

law and the contract required and the parties intended that if
payment for the sheep was not made to Plaintiff at the time and
place of delivery in California or Colorado, payment would be
made by mailing to Plaintiff's residence in Sanpete County.
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Even under the provisions of Section 78-13-4 U.C.A.
amended), venue was proper in Sanpete County.

(1953, as

Itel-Pas Inc,"·

Jones,

389 So.2d 1085 (Fla. App., 1980); State v. Circuit

Court,

221 Or. 309, 351 P.2d 39 (1960).

Such a determination

by the trial court was proper and reasonable.
If initially an action is brought in the proper county, it
does not lie within the prerogative of the defendant or trial
court to transfer it to another county merely because venue
might also have been proper there.
Walker,

Walker Bank

supra, at 861; Tribolet v. Fowler, 77

&

Trust Co. v.

~riz.

59, 260

P.2d 1088 (1954); Deimler v. Ostler, 600 P.2d 814, 815 (Mont.,
1979)
Although this action might have been properly brought in
Weber County, Plaintiff chose a county equally,
proper.

if not more,

Defendants did not have an "absolute right" to have

the action transferred to Weber County when Sanpete County was
proper.
The laws regarding venue are not intended to permit a
defendant to conduct business dealings

and incur

extensive

obligations in other states and counties only to run back to
its office to claim the exclusive venue of Weber County when it
has repudiated those obligations.

Appellants' complaint that

they must have been prejudiced because a

jury in Weber county

might have found differently is self-serving and arises only
because of the outcome of the jury's deliberation.
supported by the facts or record herein.
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It is not

i

Moreover, Appellants waived whatever right they claimed
when they requested (and received) an extension of time "to
answer" Plaintiff's Complaint.

IR. 23)

Nello L. Teer Co.

v.

Hitchcock Corporation, 235 N.C. 741, 71 S.E.2d 54 (1952).
Defendants' Motion for change of venue was properly denied
by the trial court.
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I

I

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF A
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEE BASED UPON DEFENDANT'S WILLFUL
AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT.
Appellants maintain that th€ trial court erred in
submitting to the jury th€ question of punitive damages for
John Clay's offensive conduct.

Specifically, Defendants

complain that there is no basis for the trial court's
a reasonable attorneys'

f€e.

awar~

of

(Aplt. Brief, pp. 31-32)

Appellants ignore the substantial evidence which fully supports
both the jury's verdict and the court's finding that the
Def€ndant's conduct was "willful and malicious."
Instruction No. 25,

(not No. 4 as cited by Appellants)

permitted the jury to consider an award to Plaintiff of
punitive damages if it found that "Defendant's conduct in
injuring Plaintiff was willful and malicious."

(Instruction

25; JIFU, Section 90.76) The jury so found and awarded,
punitive damage,

albeit one dollar.

consideration of attorneys'

By stipulation, the

fees was left to the trial court

(and not the jury) for determination.

(Pretrial Order, R. 841

Th€ trial court found as the jury did and entered its finding
that the "conduct of the Defendant John Clay and Company and
its officers and employees was willful, malicious and
oppressive as found by the jury."

(App. C, Finding

U)

Based

upon this finding and the undisputed affidavit of reasonable
attorneys'

f€es, Plaintiff was awarded $21,400.00 attorneys

fees.
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Since attorneys'

fees and costs of litigation may be

appropriately considered by a trial court as an element or part
of punitive damages, Appellants' real dispute appears to be the
propriety of punitive damages and the sufficiency of the
findings of willful and malicious conduct.

DeBry_~~~_Hil~~~

Travel v. Capital International Airways, 538 P.2d 1181, 1185
(Utah, 1978);

Linscott ~g~12ie_i::._~~ti~na1=_ _~if_e _Insu;:_1!12£e__Co.,

100 Ida. 854, 606 P.2d 958, 966 (1980); Kramer and Schnebeck,
"Punitive Damages in Idaho," 17 Idaho L.R. 87, 90 (1980);
Mallar and Roberts, "Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled
Approach," The 31 Hastings L.J. 639, 649-50, 668 (1980).

Even

the case of Lyman Grazing Association v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443,
473 P.2d 905 (1970), cited by Appellants, states that
attorneys'
or

fees are appropriate upon a showing of fraud, malice

w~nt~~e_~~

damages.

such as would sustain an award of punitive

473 P.2d at 908.

The propriety of punitive damages in contract actions has
been the subject of substantial recent discussion by courts and
scholars which is ignored in Appellants' Brief.

"Developments

in Utah Law," 1979 Utah Law Rev., 347, 367-70; Sullivan,
"Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract," 61 Minn. L.Rev. '207
(1976-77); "The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in
Contract Actions," 8 Indiana L.Rev. 668, 681 (1974); 31 The
Hastings L.J. 639, supra; "Punitive Damages in Contract
Actions, etc.," 20 Washburn L.J. 86 (1980), Lee, "Punitive
Damages on Ordinary Contracts," 42 Mont L.Rev. 93 (1981) and
numerous cases cited therein.
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Appellants' attempt to constrict the law is not even
supported by their own cases.
the affirmative,

Contrary to their assertion in

it is not necessary to show "an underlying

tort" as the basis for a punitive damage award.
at 27)

For example, Cur_t_i,_ss v. Aetna

(Aplt. Brief

Lif~_In~ur~l'!S:~-~~·

qo

N.M. 105, 560 P.2d 169, 172-73 (N.M. App., 1976), states that
"willful and wanton" means an "actual or deliberate intention
to harm" or "an utter indifference to or conscious disregard
for the rights of others."
affirmed.

The award of punitive damages was

In Lull v. Wick Construction Co., 614 P.2d 321

(Alaska, 1980), that court observed that punitive damages are
allowed in some states for "malicious or grossly reckless"
breach of contract but that in Alaska no punitive damages were
recoverable on any basis.

(614 P.2d at 325)

!

But, see Clary

Insurance Agency v. DoY!.E;_, 620 P. 2d 194, 202-204 (Alaska 1 q9Q)
where an Alaskan award of punitive damages was affirmed by thal
court.
While some courts may categorize such conduct as the
equivalent of an "independent tort," other courts merely refer
to it as "willful," "malicious" or "reckless disregard for
plaintiff's rights".

Regardless of the label,

the focus is not!

upon a convenient catch word but on the nature and type of
Defendant's wrongful conduct and the manner in which the
contract is breached.

Nash v. Craiq~q,

585 P.2d 775, 778

(Utah, 1978); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152,
382 (1963);

Palombi v. D&C_B~i_l_qe_rs,

379 P.2d 380,

22 Utah 2d 297, 452 p, 2d
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325 (1969).

In PalqJl!Qh• this Court reversed a nonjury award of

punitive damages because there was no record of willful,
malicious conduct by defendant.

In Nash, this Court reversed

the ruling of the lower court that punitive damages were not
available in a suit for specific performance of a contract.
see 1979 Utah L.R., supra, at 368-69.

See, also Elkington v.

618 P.2d 37 (Utah, 1980).

Fou~1:_,

See, also, Linscott v. Ranier National Life Insurance Co.,
supra, at 962 (disregard of the known property or legal rights
of others}; Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 429 P.2d
368, 378 (1967);

P.2d 598 (1967)

Sta~\'_~

Ois1:_i::_h_c:_1:__c_qu_!:.1:_, 149 Mont. l31, 423

(violation of state law); Fausel v. Ted Walker

Mobile Homes Inc., 60? P.2d 507, 510-11 (Ariz. App., 1979);
Kiser v. Gilmore,

2 Kan. App. 2d 638, 587 P.2d 911 (1979)

("wanton disregard for the rights of others");

Ver_nol'!-1:J:.~~

Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp, 316 N.E. 2d 381, 384 (Ind.
App., 1974)(a "heedless disregard of the consequences, malice,
~ass

fraud or oppressive conduct"}; Amoco Production Co. v.

Alexander,
~rform

594

s.w.

2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App., 1979)(failure to

as a "reasonably prudent operator" under a lease

agreement);

Ad<;_Jl!~~-~i_tfield,

290 So. 2d 49 (Fla.,

1974)("gross negligence indicating a wanton disregard for the
rights of others");

31 The Hastings L •. J.,

Indiana L.R., supra, at 681.

~r_'!,

at 651-59; 8

In each of these cased, punitive

damages were properly awarded for malicious and willful breach
of contract.
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I
I

In Defendant's contract there was an implied covenant of
good faith and cooperation to prevent the parties from impeding
the other's performance of his contractual obligation.
70A-l-203, u.c.A.

(1953 as amended);

Section

Zion's Properties v. Holt,

538 P.2d 1319 (Utah, 1975); Whitfield Construction Company v.
Commercial Development Corp.,
V.I., 1975).

John Clay

Plaintiff Jorgensen.

392 F.

Supp. 982, 1009 (D.C,

had a contract with and a duty

~

Defendant was not just "caught" in

between Plaintiff and Monfort.

(Tr. 105, 410, 735)

In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,
P.2d 1032, 1037 (1973),

H18 Ca 1. Rtr. 480, 510

the California court stated that a

party to a contract has "an implied duty to deal in good
faith."

The breach of such a duty may even give rise to an

"independent tort," depending upon the nature and manner of the
Defendant's conduct.
Insurance Co., 520

Garrett v. American

s.w.

Family_li~~~al

2d 102, 121 (Mo. App.)

First Security

Bank of Bozeman v. Goddar:._9_, 593 p.'.2d 1040, 1047 (Mont. l979)
The claim that there is "ample evidence" of Defendant's
good faith is not supported by the facts, but is only
Defendant's rationalizations from the facts.
29)

Any evidence for and against the "good faith" argument of

John Clay was properly weighed by the jury.
was a

(Aplt. Brief at

For example, it

jury decision whether Defendant's knowing violations of

government regulations or its "compromise" offer after the
market price had dropped to 60c per pound were "good faith"
attempts to resolve the contract or were selfish acts without
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regard to Plaintiff's rights.

Based upon substantial evidence

supporting Plaintiff, the jury and the trial court reasonably
found that John Clay did not act in good faith or with
justification.

Appellant cannot now reargue the evidence.

Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White
(Utah, 1976).

Superior_~Q:_,·

546 P.2d 885, 88fi

Grybauskas v. Associated Estates Corp., 51 Ohio

App. 2d 231, 367 N.E. 2d 881 (1976)
Another claim raised by Appellants is an alleged lack of
sufficient evidence of the willful and malicious conduct of
John Clay.

Respondent submits that the record is replete with

evidence of gross misrepresentations, conduct contrary to the
established customs and practices in the industry, knowing
violations of federal regulations, and an attitude of reckless
disregard for Plaintiff's right to be treated honestly and
fairly under the contract.
For example:
1.

On at least five different days, John Clay and Monfort

shipped Plaintiff's lambs from the Weber feedlot without prior
notification, despite repeated promises to Plaintiff that he
would be notified.
2.

(Tr. 375, 380, 501-2, 619)

The takings without notice to Plaintiff were a gross

deviation from established custom and practice in the livestock
industry and accepted dealings between the parties.
191-94, 202-203,

3.

(Tr. 173,

205, 404, 408, 682-83: 9 CFR, Section 203.16)

The lambs taken were not weighed on "the nearest public

scale" and admittedly were not loaded or weighed according to
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either long-established custom and practice nor Packers and
Stockyards regulations.

Defendant falsely stated the lambs

were properly loaded and weighed.

This resulted in unnecessary

weight loss to the lambs before their weighing.
548-51,

4.

556, 609, 744-45, 752-54)

Defendant knowingly never provided official scale

tickets to Plaintiff.
5.

(Tr. 354, 191,

(Tr. 176, 278; 9 CFR, Section 201.49)

Defendant intentionally and repeatedly failed to pay

Plaintiff within the time required by Packers and Stockyards
regulations.
6.

(Tr. 370, 577, 645-47; 9 CFR, Section 201.43)

Defendant refused to accept delivery of Plaintiff's

lambs at 70¢ per pound after the market price had dropped to
approximately 60
7.

per pound.

(Tr. 109, 177, 251, 580-81, 735)

Defendant attempted to intimidate

~laintiff

to accept a

lower discounted price for his lambs if he "planned to be in
business" the next year.

(Tr. 251-57, 271-72; 9 CFR Section

201.43(4))

8.

Defendant attempted to "discount" the weight of

Plaintiff's lambs, a business practice condemned as unfair by
the Packers and Stockyards Administration.

(Tr. 116, 557-58,

686-88)

9.

Defendant failed properly to pay Plaintiff for lambs

received under an oral contract at 73¢ per pound.
10.

Defendant refused to pay timely Plaintiff for 274

lambs at 70¢ per pound and,

instead, paid only 65¢ per pound

after Defendant had determined not to take any more lambs from
Plaintiff.

(Tr. 113-117, 214, 370)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-36Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11.

Sparrow admitted to Plaintiff that .John /Clay still had

an obligation to take Plaintiff's lambs but that Plaintiff
would have to sue.
12.

(Tr. 392, 410, 105)

John Clay asserted that just because Monfort wouldn't

take the lambs, John Clay wouldn't take them.

(Tr. 105\

Plaintiff believes that the above facts in the record
supply more than adequate evidence of Defendant's egregious
conduct.

The finding by a jury of willful, wanton and

malicious conduct is certainly supported by substantial
evidence.

Kiser v. Gilmore, supra; Whitehead v. Allen, 63 N.M.

63, 313 P.2d 335 (1957); Curt~~._~et~~~~~-Insurance Co.,

Supra.

In fact,

to imagine a greater demonstration of

indifference and callous contempt for the parties' agreement is
difficult.
This is not just a case of "nonfeasance," but of active
"misfeasance" by Defendant John Clay.

The decision in Dahl v.

Prince, 119 Utah 556, 230 P.2d 328 (1951), cited by Appellant,
is not at all inconsistent with the judgment herein.

~here

was

no finding in Dahl of any willful or malicious conduct and no
punitive damage was awarded.

The Court's opinion does suggest

that if such a finding and award were made at trial, then an
award of attorneys'

fees would be entirely appropriate.

230

P.2d at 329.
There is no economic "injustice" to the Defendant nor
"windfall" to the Plaintiff by the Findings and Judgment.
Punitive damages are often necessary to fully compensate the
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Plaintiff, particularly if the economic bargaining power
Plaintiff is inferior to the "oppressors"
and Monfort).

oft~

(i.e., Defendant Clai

To restrict Plaintiff to recover only the

purchase price under the contract requires the Defendant to do
no more than it was originally required to do in 1979.

The

most serious consequence to John Clay is that it will
eventually have to pay only what it owed in the first place.
In fact,

the Defendant has now economically benefitted by not

having to pay Plaintiff until after at least ?. 1/2 years.

Not

only has the Plaintiff not been able to enjoy the benefit of
his contract, but he has had to bear considerable expense of
recovery in excess of the trial court's award.

(R. 177-79)

person with a legitimate cause of action should not be
discouraged from seeking relief because of substantial expense,
particularly in light of the improper motive and conduct of a
defendant.

8 Indiana L. Rev., supra, at 671-679 (1975); 61

Minn. L. Rev.,

supr~,

at 239-241 (1976);

31 Hastings L ..J.,

supra, at 649-50, 662-68.
An award merely of conventional "compensatory" damages
results in a net economic loss to the Plaintiff.

Economic

efficiency demands that the party intentionally breaching the
contract bear the cost resulting from his actions.

Otherwise,

litigation costs and fees decrease the commitment of financial
resources to the production of goods and makes a claim for
damages impractical.

Farber, "Reassessing the Economic

0
Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, " 6'

-38Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Virginia L.Rev. 1443 (1980);

Birmingham, "Breach of Contract,

Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency," 24 Rutgers L.Rev. 27'3
( 1970).
Defendants argue that the attorneys' fees must be
proportional to the one dollar punitive damage award.

By

stipulation, the Pretrial Order reserved the issue of
Plaintiff's attorneys' fee for consideration by the Court and
not the jury.

The jury did not have the opportunity to

consider the extent of Plaintiff's costs and fees and interest
as an element of his damage.

Had they done so, their

compensatory or punitive damage awards might well have been
substantially different.

22 AmJur 2d, Damages, Section 168, p.

237.

Appellants' argument that the attorneys' fees awarded must
be proportional to the amount of punitive damages awarded is
not supported by Terry v.

zc~1,

605 P.2d 314 (Utah, 1980).

It

is the rule that punitive damages (including Plaintiff's
attorneys' fees) must not be disproportionate to the

act~al

damages suffered; "or perhaps more appropriately, to the nature
of the wrong done and the injury caused."
542 P.2d 354,

359 (1975).

Kesler v. Rogers,

The attorneys' fees awarded here,

although substantial, can hardly be considered disproportionate
to the jury's verdict of $191,000.00 nor the defendant's
conduct.
In the case of Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Ida.
?66, 561 P.2d 1299, 1314 (1977),

the defendant argued, however,
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that the $12, 500 .00 attorneys' fee awarded was not "reasonably
related" to the $10,434.00 jury fee awarded.

There, an Idaho

statute allowed attorneys' fees against a bonding company.

The

court stated:
We must also disagree with defendants' argument that the
amount of an award of attorney's fees must bear a
reasonable relationship to the amount of the judgment. It
is the rule in this jurisdiction that where attorney's fees
are to be awarded the amount thereof is to be that sum
which the trial court in its discretion determines is
reasonable.
The factors to be considered have been
previously stated by this Court.
"What is a reasonable attorneys' fee is a question for
the determination of the court, taking into
consideration the nature of the litigation, the amount
involved in the controversy, the length of time
utilized in preparation for and the trial of the case
and other related factors viewed in the light of the
knowledge and experience of the court as a lawyer and
judge; it is not necessary in this connection that he
hear any evidence on the matter although it is proper
that the court may have before it the opinion of
experts.
[Citations omittedl
At the hearing held in these cases on the amount to be
awarded plaintiffs as attorney's fees, evidence on these
factors was introduced and considered by the trial court
• • • • 561 P.2d, supra, at 1314.
Plaintiff did not receive an attorneys'
excessively "punitive" amount, but, in fact,

fee award in an
less than the

costs and expenses which he has actually incurred as a result
of the Defendants' conduct.
Even aside from any punitive damage award here, it is the
recently pronounced policy of this state to award attorneys
fees to a prevailing party when the defense to the action was
without merit or good faith.
amended 1981).

Section 78-27-57, u.c.A (1953, as

Based upon the finding and verdict below and
-40-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the inherent equitable power and discretion of this r.ourt, it

may also award additional attorneys'
this appeal.

Swain v. Salt

fees for the expense of

~~~~_ge~l,_~~~~~~~

Investment

Co~,

3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955).
The judgment and award of attorneys' fees by the trial
court should be affirmed and additional attorneys'

fees awarded

for this appeal.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST TO THE PLAINTIFF.
When Appellant refused to honor its contract with
Plaintiff, Plaintiff was left with some 6,300 lambs in Ault,
being fed and cared for daily at Plaintiff's expense.

To

reduce this loss, Plaintiff resold them immediately to R. H.
Rock Company.

(Exhs.

8, 9 and 10)

The jury awarded Plaintiff

damages based upon the difference between what Plaintiff should
have received under the contract (Exh. 1) and what he received
from R. H. Rock.
Appellant claims the Court improperly awarded prejudgment
interest thereon from March 24, 1979.

March 24 was the date of

the last shipment and delivery of lambs by Plaintiff to R.H.
Rock.
Appellant does not dispute that portion of the interest
related to Defendant's agreement to reimburse Plaintiff for the
freight from California to Colorado and the difference between
274 lambs at 65/ and 70/ per pound (approximately $2,000.00).
Respondent notes with interest that Appellant cites as
authority the very cases upon which Respondent relied in the
lower court to support the award.

Bjo~~-~~eril Indust~i~

Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah, 1977); Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. Wh~
Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah, 1976); and

Jae~~-~~~~~

Construction Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah, 1976).
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These

cases affirm that when the amount due under a contract is
ascertainable at a particular time (i.e., March 24, 1979),
interest is proper from that date.

Each of these cases awarded

prejudgment interest in other similar contract or damage
act ions.
Respondent submits that Appellant has erroneously applied
the principles evoked from these cases to the instant facts.
Also, Anderson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 583 P.2d
101 (Utah,

1978),

(miscited by Appellants in their brief),

supports the award in this case.
In Anderson, the insured sued to recover the reasonable
value of certain insured personal items such as clothing,
liquor and a television set.

This Court held that the owner of

the lost items was entitled to give
thereof and the replacement cost.

hi~

opinion of the value

He need not prove an "actual

cash value at the date of the loss."

(583 P.2d at 104)

The

testimony is to be given such weight and credibility "as the
trier of fact finds reasonable under the circumstances."

Id.

Therefore, this Court reiterated its general rule that:
Prejudgment interest should be awarded in a case, such as
this, where the loss is fixed as of a particular time and
the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, and plaintiff is entitled thereto.
Id.
Defendants' argument as to what the jury might have decided
is irrelevant since it did determine that Defendant John Clay
breached the contract and the Plaintiff did not "interfere"
with it and awarded Plaintiff damages.

Just as in other cases,

the liability or alleged good faith excuse of a defendant is an
-43-
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issue for the jury and is not relevant here.
Oil Corp. v. Parker,

And_~~so~:_Pr:[_~J:t_a_'.'

245 F.2d 831, 837 (10th Cir., 1957).

Following Defendant's breach, Plaintiff disposed of his
lambs as quickly as possible and received $70.20 per animal.
Had he been able to receive the full contract price, he would
have received an additional $166,566.40.

Appellant ignores

t~

fact that even after Appellant's breach until the date of
shipment of the last lambs, Plaintiff was required to continue
to pay the feedlot charges for their care and feeding.

When

the last lambs were weighed and delivered, Plaintiff's damage
was then capable of mathematical calculation.

Appellants

no

not seem to have any difficulty making the calculations in
their Brief.

Instead, they attempt to reargue the

"speculation" of what John Clay might have done had it not
breached the contract.

(Applt. Brief at 34-35)

In Jack B. Parsons Construction Co., the contract amount
was sufficiently ascertainable by calculation even though there
was a dispute as to the proper method of calculation of the
damages.

552 P. 2d at 109.

In

Bjor~2~-~E_r_Ll,_ _Indu_~~~~s,

Inc~,

supra, the court specifically listed those types of cases where
damages would be "incomplete" or could not be calculated wi~
"mathematical accuracy"

(e.g., personal injury,

imprisonment, wrongful death, de fama ti on, etc.).
the case where, as here,
figures.

false
Such is not

the loss can be measured by facts ano

Just as the market value of the stock was fixed in

Bjork, the market price of the lambs here was fixed by contract
and the weight then determined.
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In U.S.

Fideli:t=Y__~~Gu~ran~y_~o~~~~~over

Creek Cattle

co., 452 P.2d 993, 1004 (Idaho, 1969), the Idaho court imposed
prejudgment interest on the obligation which a cattle purchaser
and his surety owed to the seller.

The buyer owed for two

shipments of a total of 137 head of cattle.

The court stated

that:
. . ~W]here the amount of liability is liquidated or
capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical processes as
it is here, this Court has allowed interest from a time
prior to judgment, for in that event the interest in fully
compensating the injured party predominates over other
equitable considerations.
452 P.2d at 1004.
See, also, Automated Medical Laboratories Inc. v. Armour
Pharmaceutical Company, 629 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir., 1980);
and Anderson-Prichard Oil

~i::_p_~

_v

.__Pa_r:_k.~i::_,

supra.

While a mere six percent annual interest cannot "fully
compensate the injured party" when compared with present double
digit interest and inflation rates,

it is a proper step towaro

providing such complete and equitable compensation.
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CONCLUSION
The jury's verdict in favor of Respondent and against the
Defendants is supported by substantial evidence and should be
affirmed.

The funding by the jury and by the court of

Defendant, John Clay's, willful malicious and oppressive
conduct and the award of costs and attorneys fees as punitive
damages should also be affirmed.
Venue was proper in Sanpete County and the trial court did
not err or abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
Defendant's Motion to Change Venue to Weber County.
The proceedings in lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of November, 1981.

/~~

l

..<

-------

---------

~rthur l'L Nielse
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Respondent,
Neil Jorgensen
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
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Arthur H. Nielsen
Stephen L. Henriod
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Telephone:

521-3350

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff,

v.
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a corporation,
and AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPAJ.'.'Y,
a corporation,

JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT
Civil No. c-7894

Defendants.

The jury duly impaneled in the above-entitled matter having
returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and

against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of
$191,463.40 general damages and $1.00 punitive damages; and the
Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company having stipulated,
through its counsel, that in the event of a judgment in favor of
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant that the said Defendant
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company was and is liable to the
Plaintiff in an amount of $75,000.00, and there being no just
reason why judgment should not be entered immediately upon said
verdict,

NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the
Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and against the Defendant John Clay and
Company in the sum of $191,464.40, of which amount judgment is
further entered in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and
against the Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company in the
sum of $75,000.00, together with interest on all of said judgment
as shall hereafter be determined by the Court.

Plaintiff is

further awarded his costs incurred herein.
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Pursuant to the Pretrial Order, the amount of interest,
any, and whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and,
so, the amount thereof are reserved for future determination t
the Court.
DATED this

July, 1980.

'11:.

,,,,

··,-~··.:

'%;.::
,..

-·

~"·

;;. ~-~"
...~.......~

0~
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Arthur H. Nielsen
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:

532-1900

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff,

v.
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a
corporation, and AETNA
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendants.

AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
Civil No. C-7894

JUDG~c;.;;

JJUDGM:;t:·.·
fiila._tl

,, /

,.

~-·---L---P~90 __ ~

The court entered on July 8, 1980, its Judgment on the
jury's verdict in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and
against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of
$191,463.40 general damages and $1.00 punitive damages and
against Defendant Aetna casualty and Surety Company in the sum
of $75,000.00, reserving in said Judgment for future determination
the amount, if any, to be awarded to Plaintiff as interest and

attorneys' fees.

Thereafter, said Judgment was appealed to the

Utah Supreme Court by the Defendants, which court dismissed said
appeal and returned the case to this Court for the purpose of
determining the issues relating to interest and attorneys• fees.

This Court having entered its Supplemental Judgment and considered
the objections thereto by the Defendants and the memoranda
submitted by the respective parties, and having entered its
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, makes the
following Amended Order:
NOW, THEREFORE, Plaintiff is hereby awarded further judgment
against the Defendant John Clay and Company as follows:
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1.

Interest from March 24, 1979, to July 8, 19 80, in ,.. ,

sum of $14,822.37.
2.

Interest from July 8, 1980, to January 25, 1981,

10

amount of $9,087.21 and further interest at the rate of $45.i
per day thereafter.
3.

Attorneys' fees in the amount of $21,400.00.

The foregoing is supplemental and in addition to the JuC::--

heretofore entered by the Court on July 8, 1980, in the sum,,,
$191,463.40 general damages and $1.00 punitive damages, toget.
with Plaintiff's ccsts in the sum of $276.30, of which $75,o,:·

.

was awarded against both Defendants .
DATED this

2-=3

day of Februar;u..J3.!l:::....:-----.----

APPENDIX B--page 2
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Arthur H. Nielsen
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:

532-1900

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
NEIL JORGENSEN,
Plaintiff,

v.
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a
corporation, and AETNA
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY,
a corporation,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
civil No. c-7894

Defendants.

The Court entered on July 8, 1980, its Judgment on the jury's
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and against the
Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of $191,463.40 general
damages and $1.00 punitive damages and against Defendant Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company in the sum of $75,000.00, reserving
in said Judgment for future detennination the amount, if any, to
be awarded to Plaintiff as interest and attorneys' fees.

There-

after, said Judgment was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court by
the Defendants, which court dismissed said appeal and returned
the case to this Court for the purpose of determining the issues
relating to interest and attorneys' fees.

This Court having

entered its Supplemental Judgment and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in support thereof, and having considered the
objections thereto by Defendants and the memoranda submitted by
the respective parties, now enters the following Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The conduct of the Defendant John Clay and Company and
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its officers and employees was wilful, malicious and

oppre~~.

as found by the jury.
2.

By reason of the wilful, malicious and oppressive

c,. _

of Defendant John Clay and Company and its officers and dire:c·
Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee for pro:::1
this action.
3.

From March 3, 1979, through October 31, 1980, Plaine.:

counsel have devoted in excess of 380 hours in representing
Plaintiff's interest in seeking recovery from Defendants,
including, among other things, numerous telephone calls;
investigation; research of the law; photocopying; preparatio:.
and filing of pleadings; preparation and filing memoranda i:-.
opposition to Defendants' motion for change of venue; appea:a::
in court re motion for change of venue; taking of depositions

I

I

of Defendants' principal officers; representing Plaintiff in
connection with depositions taken by Defendants of Plaintif~

I

r-

his son in Salt Lake City and depositions of third-party w1tr.;<e:
in Greeley, Colorado; preparation for trial; preparation oft::.
memoranda; preparation of proposed instructions to the jury::.:
trial of the case in Manti involving four days.
4.

Also, Plaintiff's counsel has represented Plaintiff::

Plaintiff's motion for attorneys

1

fees and interest, includir.~

the research, preparation and filing of memoranda and affidavl'.
and oral argument of Plaintiff's motion.
5.

This matter further involved unique questions of la~

and fact.
6.

Considering the nature of the action, the amount of

ti.me and expertise involved, the result obtained and the us'Jal
and ordinary charges made by attorneys in the State of
particularly in Sanpete County, an attorneys' fee of

Utah

an:

s21, 4oo.o':

is a reasonable fee for the services rendered and includes :.;,e
sum of $1, 400. 00 of costs and expenses incurred for airline
automobile travel, hotel and motel expense in connection
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i-;.

1>.·i:·

_,'

the trial and the taking of depositions in Greeley, Colorado.

7.

The Plaintiff should be awarded interest on the amount

of damages sustained by him from March 24, 1979, to July 8, 1980,
at the rate of 6% per annum ($31.47 per day) for 471 days for an
amount of $14,822.37 against the Defendant John Clay and Company.
8.

The Plaintiff should be awarded interest from the date

of the Judgment on the verdict (July 8, 1980) to the date of the
entry of this Order at the rate of 8% per annum for an amount of
$9,087.21 to January 25, 1981, and $45.21 per day thereafter
against the Defendant John Clay and Company.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and
enters the following Conclusions of Law:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded an additional judgment

against Defendant John Clay and Company for interest from March
24, 1979, to July 8, 1980, in the amount of $14,822.37.
2.

Plaintiff should be awarded an additional judgment for

interest against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the
amount of $9,087.21 to January 25, 1981, and $45.21 per day
thereafter.
3.

The Plaintiff should be awarded an additional judgment

against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of
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-2.!Y-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact a:

Conclusions of Law and accompanying Amended Supplemental Jud?..!
by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to Mr. Richard 11.
Campbell and Mr. Richard L. Stine, 2 650 Washington Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah 84401, this ~day of February, 1981.

APPENDIX C--page 4
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<3 > Any

lawful cha.-ges, and such other facts a.s

agreement.

referred

\..o

~-<=

ln

para.graphs (b) <1) or l2> of this sec
t lon. shall be disclosed tn the record.:_

may be necessary to complete the ac-

count and show fully the tru. e nature \
of the transaction.

of any market agency or dealer selH.ng
such livestock, and ln the records of
the packer, market agency or dealer

<bl Prompt payment for ltvestock-

lerTn$ and conditions. <U No packer.
purchasing such livestock, and re
market agency, or dealer shall purtalned by such person tor such time ""
chase livestock for which payment Is
Is required by any law. or by written
made by a draft whch Is not a check,
notice served on such person by the
unless the seller expressly agrees In
Administrator. but not less than twc
writing before the transaction that
calendar years from the date of expl·
payment may be made by such a draft.
ration thereof.
<In cases of packers whose average
<t> No packer, market agency or
annual purchases exceed $500,000, and
market agencies and dealers acting as
dealer shall. as a condition of purchase
agents for such packers, see also
by him of livestock. impose, demand.
1201.200.)
compel or dictate the terms or manner
<2><1l No packer, market agency, or
of payment, or attP.mpt to obtain a
dealer purchasing livestock tor cash
payment agreemer.t from a seller
and not on credit, whether tor slaughthrough any
eat of retaliation of
ter or not tor slaughter, shall mail a
other
form of t
a on.
~
check In payment for the livestock 1 c
re asers to promptly reimburse
unless the check ls placed In an enve- · agents. Each packer, market agency,
lope with proper first class postage
or dealer who utilizes or employs an
prepaid and properly addressed to the
seller or such person as he may direct, ! agent to purchase livestock for him,
shall. In transactions where such agent
In a post office, letter box, or other receptacle re11ularly used for the deposit · uses his own funds to pay for livestock.
purchased on order, transmit, or delivof mall for delivery, from which such
er to such agent the full amount of
envelope ts scheduled to be collected
the purchase price before the close of
<al before the close of the next bust·
the next business day followln11 re·
ness day following the purchase of
celpt
of notification of the payment of
livestock and transfer of posse... ion
such purchase price. unless otherwise
thereof, or <bl In the case of a chase
expressly a1reed between the parties
on a "carcass" or "grade and yield"
before the purchase of the livestock..
basis. before the close ot the first business day following determination of \ Any such agreement shall be disclosed
' In the records of the principal and In
the purchase price.
!Ill No packer. market agency, or , the records of any market a11mcf. ~r
dealer purchasing livestock for slaugh- : dealer acting as such a11ent.
·· J
ter, shall mail a check In payment for I <d> The provisions of paragraphs bl
the livestock unless <al the check Is '<1 l and <cl of this section shall not be
made available for actual delivery and
construed to permit any transact1011
the seller or his duly authorized repreiprohlblted by I 201.6l<al relating to fl.'
sentative Is not present to receive pay.
nanclng by market &11encles sellln11 911
ment, at the point of transfer of posa commission basis, or by 1201.68 re-;
session of such livestock, on or before
tatln11 to flnancln11 pack.era by ·dealers
the cll'Se of the next business day folor vice versa.
lowln11 the purchase of the livestock
and transfer of possession thereof, or.
<Secs. 202, 301, 312, tOI, t2 Stat. Ill. 115,
In the case of a purchase on a "car161, 168: 1 u.s.c. 112. 208. 213. 221;-. toe.
as added by aec. 1. 90 Stat. 12!>0; 1 U .S.C.
cass" or "11rade and yield" basts, on or
228b; 1 CFR 2.11, Ut; t2 F'R 31M12al
before the close of the first business
day following determination of the
119 FR 028, July 22. 19H. as amended at 29
purchase price; or unless <bl the seller
FR 1196, Feb. 6. Ifft; 38 FR 2'111, Feb. 10.
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b-J:s.

i.o

ob11Un

£.t-oo~.-ctr.o

due Lhe 1na.-kcf, agency

..'•

£.he

&B

buvers ·

the Secretary fJnds that any
m.-ket agency or Hcen.see ha.s used for
purPoses of its own any funds received
tor the purchase of Hvestock or live
poultry on a commlssJon or agency
und3. If

f;;~::r.,~~Fi::fa~~~.,;~;~~:.~~::;.:r.!E

.. un-.a

or Jfce1:isee

compensaL1on for tr..s services.
Ce) Crutodial account& for

ratJon.

( h)

Any
market agency or licensee which has
established and maintains the separate custodial account referred to in
paragraph (b) of this section may
Certificates

of

deposiL

e)

Invest, In certificates of deposit Issued
basis, or any other funds which have
by the bank In which such account ls
come into Its possession In Its capacity
kept, such portion of the custodial
as agent or the buyer, such market
funds as will not Impair the market
agency or licensee shall thereafter deagency's or licensee's ability to meet
posit any such funds In a separate
Its obligations to Its consignors. Such
bank account designated as "Custodial
certificates of deposit shall be made
Account for Buyers' ,Funds," or by a
payable to the market agency or lisimilar Identifying designation, which
censee in Its fiduciary capacity as
account shall be set up under terms
trustee of the custodial funds.
and conditions with the bank where
established, to disclose that the de[32 FR 20921. Dec. 29, 19871
positor Is acting as a fiduciary with respect thereto and that the funds In
ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS
the account are trust funds. Such ac§ 201.43 Payment and a«ountin1 ror llvecounts shall be drawn on only for pay•tock and
poultry.
ment of the purchase price of livestock
or live poultry purchased on behalf of
<a> Market agencies and licensees to
a principal and to obtain therefrom
make prompt accounting and transthe sums due the market agency or limittal of net proceeds. Each market
censee as compensation for Its seragency shall, before the close of the ~
vices, and for such sums as are necesnext business day following the sale of
sary to pay all legal charges Incurred
any livestock consigned to It for sale,
In connection with the purchase of
transmit or deliver to the consignor or
livestock or live poultry which the
shipper of the livestock, or his duly
market agency or licensee may In Its
authorized a.gent, In the absence of
capacity as agent, be required to pay
any knowledge that any other person,
for and on behalf of Its principal.
or persons. has any Interest In the liveU> Account. and records. Every
stock, the net proceeds received from
market agency and licensee shall keep
the sale and a true written account of
such accounts and records as wlll at all
such sale, showing the number,
times disclose the handling or the
weight, and price of each kind of
funds In the custodial account reanimal sold, the name of the purchasferred to in paragraphs <bl and <e> of
er, the dat.. of sale,-the commission,
this section, Including without limitayardage, and other lawful charges, and
tion, such accounts and records as wlll 1 such other facts as may be necessary
at all times disclose the names of the
to complete the account and show
consignors and the amount due and 1 fully the true nature of the transacpayable to each from funds In the Custion. Each licensee, acting as a broker,
factor, or commission merchant, shall,
todial Account for Shippers' Proceeds,
before the close of the next business
and the names of the principals, from
day following the sale of live poultry
whom funds have been received In the
consigned to it for sale, transmit or decapacity of buyer for such principals,
liver to the consignor or shipper of the
the amount of funds received from
live poultry, or his duly authorized
such principals, and the amount paid
agent, in the absence of any knowlon behalf of such principals from
edge
that any other person, or perfunds In the Custodial Account for
ons, has any Interest In the live poulBuyers' Funds.
(g) Insured bank.!. The separate cusry, the net proceeds received from the
todial accounts referred to In paraale and a true written account of such . . .
ale provided
showing
the
number
ofand
pounds
graphs by
<bltheand
<e> of Law
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section
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and condltlons as the pa.rues
may agree upon. Each ticket shall be
terO"l.S

legibly slgned by the seller a.nd the
buyer or authorized .-epresentattves
thereof and when thus signed shall

constitute the contract of purchase
and sale. One copy of such ticket shall
be retained by the seller. On request a
copy shall be furnished to the buyer.
A copy shall be transmitted with an
accounting of the sale to the owner or
consignor of the live poultry if the
transaction is one on an agency basis.
Settlement betw<en seller and buyer
shall be on the basis of the duly executed and signed tickets required by
this section unless good cause is shown
!or settlement on some other basis.
I 19 FR 4529. July 22. 19541

f 201.'9 llequlremenla

regardln~
acale
ticketa Hldenclnr wei(hlnr of' 11••llOck-

<a> When livestock is wel11hed for
purpose of purchase or sale. a scale
ticket shall be issued which shall
show: <1 l The name and location of
the agency performing the weighing
service; <2 > the date of the weighin11;
<3 >the name of the buyer and seller or
consignor. or a designation by which
they may be readily identified; <4l the
number of head; <5> kind; <6> actual
weight of the livestock; and <1> the
name, Initials, or number of the
person who weighed the livestock. or if
required by State law, the signature of
the weighmaster. Scale tickets issued
under this section shall be serially
numbered and sufficient copies exec!!ted to. prnvlde"!!_lffipy io all Pl'ftJes
to the transaction.
· <b)" In instances where the weight
values are recorded by means of automatic weighing and recording equipment 1irectly on the account of sale or
other basic record, this record may
servt' in lieu of a scale ticket.
<cl Stockyard owners. market agencies, and dealers who own or operate
livestock scales shall be responsible for
the accurate weighing of livestock and
the execution and issuance of scale
tickets.

~~~.._;.::-~-......-·..:..:~.._
ltiD. ~

..,•;;.2>. • .;.:.: ...·.~:::,.:.·._'.";,_; ""-:~r~

1LIT>.ended: "l

t'."'::_'.:_

U S C . ".?;22. 22lHa.\; ,,..,,c

¥ ' of Lhe Fo:'de.-a.l Tll"r..dc Comml.:::..::.\on Acl 3
'121. 1~ U.S.C. •6lK:)): 3'1 FR 284.6!

Stal.

284.'11)

lJ9 FR 8913. Mar. 1. 19'ltl
~

201.50

Records; diapoaation.

<al Except as otherwise provided I:
paragraphs (bl and <cl of this sectim
no stockyard owner, market agenci
dealer. or licensee shall, without ti•
consent in writing of the Adminlstr
tor. destroy or dispose of any book
records, documents, or papers whi<
contain, explain, or modify transa.
tions in his business under the Act.
<bl Every stockyard owner. mark"
agency, dealer, or licensee may destrc
or dispose of the following categorh
of records after they have been rt
talned !or a period of 2 full calenda
years:
STOCKYARD OWNERS

All (eed records.
Dipping and spraying orders.
Vacclnattn1 and testing orders.
Orders tor speclal services.
. f
Routlne correspondence.
Railroad advance char1es.
ems to commission firms and others.
Records of shipments by States and ml
kets.
Deposit slips.
Bank statements.
Cancelled checks and drafts.
Check stubs.
Rallroad in-bound records.
Truck-in receipt records.
Delivery records.
Yarding recelpt..s.
Pass-out and delivery orders.
Truck shlpplnK orders.
Railroad shlppln1 orders.
Scale yardin1 records.
Scale tickets.
Scale test reports.
MARK&'I' AGENCIES

Scale tickets.
Bllls from stockyard company.
Bills (or livestock purchased.
Gate tickets.
Routine correspondence.
Way-bills and truckers tickets.
Accounts of sales.
Accounts o( purchases.
Bills and Invoices to buyer...
Deposit slips.
Bank statements.
Cancelled checks and drafts.

Check stubs.
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market agency and Hcen.see
shaJJ, µromptJy foJJowing the purchase
of livestock or Jive poultry on a comnus.sion or agency basis. transmU or
deliver lo lhe person for whose account such purchase was made, or his
Ea•.:t1

duly authorized agent, a true written

account of the purchase showing the
number. weight, and price of each
kind of animal purchased. or the
weight and price of each kind of live
poultry purchased. the names of the
persons from whom purchased, the
date of purchase. the commission and
other lawful charges. and such other
facts as may be necessary to complete
the account and show fully the true
nature of the transaction.
[19 FR 4528, July 22. 19541

f 201.45 Market agenciea and Ucen1ee1 to

make records available for inspection
by ownen, conaignon, and purchaaera.

Each market agency and licensee engaged In the business of selling or
buying livestock or Jive poultry on a
commission or agency basis shall, on
request from an owner, consignor, or
purchaser, make available copies of
bills covering charges paid by such
market agency or licensee for and on
behalf of the owner. consignor, or purchaser which were deducted from the
gross proceeds or the sale or livestock
or Jive poultry or added to the purchase price thereof when accounting
for the sale or purchase.
119 FR 4528. July 22. 19541

I 201.46 Slockyard ownen, markel a1en-

<iea, dealen, and Ileen- lo keep
dally record.

<al Each stockyard owner, In addition lo other necessary records, shall
make and keep an accurate record or
the number or head of each class or
livestock received, shipped, or disposed
of locally each day. Each market
agency or dealer buying or sellln1 livestock on a commission basis or otherwise. except packer buyers registered
as dealers to purchase livestock for
slaughter only, In addition to other
necessary records, shall make and
keep an accurate record of the number

... ••.• _ .......

e>r

~

....... _.-,., •••• -..._ ........... _ .... -··•<A.

o"-h••rwln•• d i s p o s e d

~I

ca.ch

lbu,,.ln..,._

day. the prlce.s paid or received therefor. and the charges made tor services.

Cb) Each Ucensee buying or selHnai
Hve poultry on a commission basis or
otherwise, In addition to other nece5~

sary records. shall make and keep an
accurate record of the number of

•

pounds of live poultry bought or sold
each business day, the prices paid or
received therefor. and lhe charges
made for services and facilities.
( 19 FR 4528, July 22. 1954, a.s amended at 24
FR 3183. Apr. 24, 19&91

I 201.47 Markel arenclea and licen1ee1 lo
di1cloae bua.ineu relatJon1hiP9. if any.
with purchaien.

No market agency or licensee acting
as a broker, factor, ::.r commission merchanl shall knowingly sell or dispose
of consigned llveslock or live poultry
lo any person In whose business such
market agency or licensee, or any
stockholder, owner, ortlcer, or employee thereof, has a financial Interest, or
to any· person who has a financial Interest In such markel agency or licensee, unless the market agency or licensee discloses on lhe accounts of sales
Issued to the consignors concerned the
nature of the relationship exlstln1 between the market agency or licensee
and the buyers of the livestock or live
poultry and then only If lhe livestock
or live poultry has been offered for
sale on the open market and the purchaser's bid exceeds that or other bidders. The provisions of this section
shall not be construed to permit any
transaction prohibited by H 201-57 and
201.60 relating to sales or livestock or
live poultry out of consllOffients to
owners, officers, agents, or employees
of market agencies or licensees to
which the livestock or live poultry was
consigned.
119 FR 4529, July 22, 19541

I

I 201.48 Sellen or live poullry lo luue
aalea llcketa al de1lrna1ed marketa.

With respect to each purchase or
sale of live poultry by licensees at desl1Dated markets a ticket shall be prepared by the seller at the time of sale.
Each ticket shall show the name of
the
desl1Dated market, the date of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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t.he Admlnlst.ra.t..or: .Provjd.ed,. That. t.he

t..est and t:nspecUon ro.-rns used by t.he
State or other governmental aaency
contain aubstantlally the sa.me infor-

mation as that required by the official

fonn.
[19 FR 4531, July 22. 1954. u amended at 24
FR 3183, Apr. 24, 1959; 26 FR 1626. Feb. 24,
1961; 29 FR 4645, Apr, I. 1964; 32 FR 7700,
May 28, 19611

1201.76 Scaleo: repatn., aclJuatmenta, or

replaeementa afler inopectlon.
No scale shall be operated or used by
any stockyard owner, market agency,
dealer, or licensee unless It has been
found upon test and Inspection to be
In a condition to give accurate wel11hta.
If any repairs, adjustments, or replacement& are made upon such a scale It
shall not be placed In use until It has
again been tested and Inspected In accordance with the re11ulatlons In this
part.
(19 PR •D32. July 22, 19H. as amended at 2•
A,PR llH. Apr. 2•. 19591

'9't 201.76

Reweirhlnr.
Stockyard owners, market &11encles,
dealers, packers, and licensees, or their
employees, shall reweigh livestock or
live poultry on request of duly authorized representatives of the Secretary.
12• FR 3164,

Apr. 24, 19581

• 201.77 WeII hi nr •,or pur- olber tha n

purchue or ..1e.
Every stockyard owner, market
agency, dealer, packer, and licensee
who weighs livestock or live poultry
for purposes othrr than purchase or
sale shall show on the scale tickets or
other records used ln connection with
such weights the fact that they are
not weights for the purpose of purchase or sale.
124 FR 3184. Apr. 24, 19591

r

f 201.78 Packer ocaIea.

<al Packers owning or operating livestock or monorail scales on which livestock or livestock carcasses are
weighed for purpose of purchase of
livestock In commerce on a live or
dressed weight basis shall Install,

-

m::.~o--::,:r~.=,--.:,:::~:r~:-:e'iJl:s.;'~~~c~~.t
a.nee w1.t.h lnst.ruct.ton.s of the Admln.l.6-

trat.or and shall submit to the Area
Supervlsor coplea of reports on at leaat
two scale tests made durlnK each cal-

endar year. They shall employ only

competent persons of good character

and known Integrity to operate such
scales and shall require such employees to operate the scales ln accordance
with Instructions of the Administrator. Any employee found to be operatln11 scales Incorrectly, carelessly, ln
violation of Instructions or In such a
manner as to favor or Injure any party
or agency through Incorrect weighing
or Incorrect weight recording shall be
removed from his weighing duties. No
scale shall be used by any packer In
weighing livestock or livestock carcasses for purpose of purchase of livestock on a live or dressed weight ba.als
unless It has been found, upon test
and Inspection, to be In condition to
yield accurate weights. If any repairs,
adjustments, or replacements are
made of a scale It shall not be used
until It has been retested and ·found
accurate.
<cl All livestock scales shall be
equipped with a type-registering
welghbeam, a dial with a mechanical
dcket printer, or a similar device
which shall be used for printing or
stamping the weight values on scale
tickets. For each draft of livestock
weighed for purpose of purchase or
sale a scale ticket shall be Issued showIng, In addition to the weight of the
livestock and the amount of dockage,
If any, the name of the seller, the
name of the buyer, the species,
number of head, Initials of weigher,
and date of weighing. Scale !.lc!<etsJ
shall be executed at least.mdupllcate,
one- copyllelng 'supplied to the seller
pr buyer as- the case may be and. on~
copy being retain~<! by the packer.
<Secs. 202, 401, n Stat. 161 et seq .. u
amended; 1 U.S.C. 192. 2211
130 FR 16t9. June 12. 1965. as amended at
32 FR 1100. May 26. 19811
Non: The reportlni and record-keeping
reQulrements contained herein have been
approved by the Bureau of Budget In ac·
cordance with the Federal Reports Act of
110..
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to

a..ny

have

lnance,

corporat.e

OT

any owner:snJp

or partJcJpate tn

ent or operation ol auch

ctton shall not be con·

It or prohibit any packer

the servJces of aH or any

tom feedlot tor the purg lt.s own livestock led tor
lt.s own slaughter, nor
t that a packer advances
feedlot funds normally
the purchase or compenvestock, teed, veterinary
ther goods or services In
Ith the feeding of Its own
r purposes of lt.s own
deemed to contravene
No custom feeder shall be
olate this section by sellY part of 11.s services to
y receiving necessary liveservices, or funds thereckers In connection with
f packer owned livestock
s of slaughter by said
t aeq.l
ay 11. 19141

SERVICES
rate welrhte.
kyard owner, market
r, or licensee who weighs
live poultry shall Install,
d operate the scales used
hlng so as to Insure accu. All livestock scales shall
with. a type-registering
a dial with a mechanical
r, or a slmllar device
be used tor printing or
e weight values on scale
pt. 20. 19811
a: IHlin1 of.
kyard owner, market
r, or licensee who weighs
live poultry for purposes
or sale or who furnishes
ch purposes shall cause
to be tested properly by
gencles at suitable Interance with Instructions of

::;:..:~:-~!:f..~.?cF~~...

(2<11 FR 3J83. Apr. 24. 1868. aa amended at 20

4i;

FR 1426. Feb. 2•. Uit61: 32 FR 7700. May 26,

196'11

f 201.73 &ale operaton to be competenL
Stockyard owners. market agencies.
dealers. and licensees shall employ

only competent persons of good char·

acter and known Integrity to operate
scales for weighing livestock or live
poultry tor the purpose of purchase or
sale. They shall require such employees to operate the scales Jn accordance
with Instructions of the Administrator, copies of which will be furnished
to each stockyard owner, market
agency, dealer, or licensee who employs persons to operate scales used
for the purposes herein Indicated.
They also shall require such employees to "rotate" In their weighing assignments at ·stockyards operallng
three or more scales. Any person
found to be operating scales Incorrectly, carelessly, In violation of Instructions, or in such manner as to favor or
Injure any party or agency through In·
correct weighing or Incorrect weight
recording shall be removed from hla
weighing duties.
119 FR 4531, July 22, 1954, as amended at 24

.II

FR 3183, Apr. 24, 1959; 28 FR 1828, Feb. 24,
1881; 32 FR 1100, May 28, 18811

f ZOl.74 Scalea; reporlll of tealll and ln-

1pec:tlona.
Each stockyard owner, market
a 11ency, dealer, or licensee who welgha
livestock or live poultry for purposes
of purchase or sale, shall furnish reports of tests and Inspections of scales
used for such purposes on forms which
will be furnished by the Director on
request. The stockyard owner, market
agency, dealer, or licensee shall retain
one copy of such form when executed,
shall cause one copy to be retained by
the agency conducting the test and Inspection of the scales, and shall deliver
the third copy to the Area Supervisor
having charge of the work under the
act In the particular area In which the
scales being tested are located. In case
the test and Inspection of scales as
herein required are conducted by an
agency of a State or municipality or
other governmental subdlvl.slon, the
forms ordlnarlly used by such agency

lt
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.such acknowledgment.

13

Sl.a.t.emenl. ""ll.n reap-ec1. \.0 volunl.a.,.-y

flUns o( .. u.-et.y bonds unde.- t.he Packers

'"'d St.ockya.rdB Act..

<b> Purchasing livestock for whkh
payment ls to be made by a draft

2:03.14 St.atement wlth respect t.o advertblnK allowances and other merchandl&ln1
payment& and services.

whJch ts not a check, shall constitute
purchasine such livestock on credit
within the meaning of paragraph <al
of
this
section.
<See
also
I 201.43<bl<l ll,
<cl The provisions of this section
shall not be construed to permit any
transaction prohibited by I 20l.6l<a>
relating to financing by market a11encles selling on a commission basis, or
by 1201.68 relating to tlnancln11 packers by dealers or vice versa.
(Sec. 401. 42 Stat. 188 11 U.S.C. 221 l; sec.
409, aa added by sec. 1. 90 Stat. 1250 (1
U.S.C 228bl; 1 CFR 2.17. 2.54; 42 FR 35825l
142 FR 49929, Sept. 8, 19111

203.15 Trust benefit.a under section 200 o(
the act.
203.18 Matllnl' o( <.hecks In payment for
livestock. purchased for t)auehter, for
cash and not on credit.

§ :Ml.l.1

Statement or 1enersl policy wW.
nopect to laml> bu1ln1 pnc:tlcn.
!al It has been brought to the attention or the Packers and Stockyardl
Administration, United States Depart·
ment of Agriculture, that packers,
<tealers. and market agencies subject
to the provisions of the Packers and
Stockyards Act, are engaging In certain practices In connection with the
purchase and sale or lambs In proml·
nent lamb producing areas or the
PART 203-STATEMENTS OF GENER- United States which are Injurious to
AL POLICY UNDER THE PACKERS lamb producers. The practices relate
to the discounting or prices l>Y buyers
AND STOCKY AIDS ACT
In the purchase of heavy lambs.
<b> The following methods of buyln1
~03.1 Statement of 1eneral policy with re- lambs are considered to be unratr pracspect to lamb buyln1 practlcea.
tices under the provlsiona of the Pad!·
203.2 Statement of 1enersl policy with re·
ers and Stockyards Act:
1pect to the 1lvlne by meat pack.en of
<1 l A buyer llrnltln11 payment for
meat and other 1Ut.a to Government emlambs to a desljrnated average wel11ht
ployeea.
203.3 Statement with respect to meat
and requlrln11 the Jamb producer to
pack.er salea promotion prol'rama.
give any additional wel11ht to lb•
203.4 Statement with respect to the dispobuyer without. payment.
sition of certain records made or kept by
<21 A buyer subtracting wel11ht from
packers.
the true and actual wel11ht of the
203.5 Statement with respect to market
lambs.
&l'encles paylnl' the expenses of live·
&tock buyers.
<cl The practices In parqraph <bl of
203.8 Statement with respect to the pur- this section result In mlsleadln11
chase of llveatock by packers for export. market Information and the issuance
203.1 Statement with respect to meat of Incorrect scale tickets, Invoices, and
packer sales and purchase contracts.
203.8 Statement with respect to re1ula· other documents relatln11 to the pur·
lions and practices of •tockyard ownen chase and sale transaction. It Is be·
Ueved the provisions of the Packers
and market &l'encles.
203.9 Statement with respect to the han· and Stockyards Act, under Title II and
dlln1 of custodial funds by llveatoclr. Title III. prohibit all packers, dealers,
market a1encle1 and poultry llcenseea.
and market a11encles subject to the
203.10 Statement with respect to Insolven- provisions of the Act from en11&11ln11 In
cy; definition of current auets and cur- these practices.
rent llabllltlea.
<d> In addition, the Packers and
201.11 Statement with respect to vacation
of rate ord~,. under the PM:lr.en and Stockyardl Administration has received
complaints from lamb producStockyards Act.
201.U Statement with respect to provldlnl ers with respect to the practice of
Sponsored
by
the
S.J.
Quinney
Law
Library.
Funding
for
digitization
provided
by the
Institute of Museum
and Library
dlacount1n11
prices
paid Services
oervlcea and facllltlea at atoclr.yarda on a lamb buyers
Services and Technology
administered
the Utah State
bula. Act,for
reaaonable andLibrary
nondlacrlmlnatory
lambsbywhere
the Library.
wel11ht of the
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Each packer or Hve pouJt.ry dealer or

handler shall. bel"ore the cJose of" 6
busJness days foJJowJna sla~ghter of

any pouJtry pi.Jrchased, transmit or de-

Hver to the seJJer of such poultry or
his duJY authorfzed agent the full

Ir o~.-alon to bir competent.
d Jive pouJtry deaJers and

amount of the purchase prjce thereof.
unless otherwise expressly agreed be-

alJ empJoy only competent
ood character and known

tween the parties before the purchase
of the poultry. Any such agreement
shall be disclosed In such purchaser's
records and on all accountings or
other documents Issued by such purchaser relatln11 to the transaction.

operate scales tor welghJltry tor purposes of puracqulsltlon or settlement
equlre such employees to
scales In accordance with
ions of the Administrator,
hlch will be furnished by
tration to each packer and
dealer and handler. Any
er, or other person acting
>yed by any packer or live
ler or handler found to be
ales Incorrectly, carelessly,
of weighing instructions.
a manner as to favor or
party through incorrect
incorrect wei11ht record' removed from his wei11h·

138 FR 4384, Feb. U. 19131

§ 201.200 Sale of liveotock to a packer on
credit.

<a> No packer whose average annual
purchases of livestock exceed $500,000
shall purchase livestock on credit, and
no dealer or market agency acting as
an agent tor such a packer shall purchase livestock on credit, unless: <1 >
Before purchasln11 such livestock the
packer obtains from the seller a wrltA .,
ten acknowled1J111ent as follows:

WJ

38 Stal. 721. 42 Stal. 168, u
.c. 222. 15 u.s.c. 46>
an. 23. 19711

On thls date I am enterlnl' Jnto a written
&l'reement for the sale of livestock on credit
to - - - - - - - - , a packer. and I understand that In dolnl' 10 I will have no rl&hta
under the trust provisions of section 208 of
the Packers and Stockyarcli Act, 1921. as
amended <1 U.S.C. 196, Pub. L. 94-UO>. with
respect to any auch credit aale. The written
a1reement for such aell1n1 on credit
Coven a slna:le sale.
Provides that It wm remain In eflect until
!date>.
Provide• that It will remain In eflect until
canceled In wrltlnl' by either party.
<Omit the provlalona not applicable.>
Date - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Slsnature - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

eirhln1.
d live poultry dealers and
their employees, shall
poultry on request of dulY
presentatlves of the Secof wel1hlnJ.
live poultry Is weighed on
a packer or live poultry
dler, the 11ross weight
rmlned on the scale norfor such purpose as
possible after the poultry
he vehicle.

<2> such packer retains such ack11owled1J111ent, together with all other
documenta, If any, settln11 forth the
terma of such credit sales on which
the purchaser and seller have agreed,
and such dealer or market agency retalna a copy thereof, In his records for
such time as la required by any law. or
by written notlc• served on such
person by the Administrator. but n o &
leu than two calendar years from th
date of expiration of the written

8 Stal. 721, 42 Stat. 118, u

.c. 222. 15 u.s.c. 48)
• 23. 19711

rUna and recordkeepln1 rethe revlatd re1ulatlona have
by the Office of Manqe1et In accordance with the
Act of 1842.

42
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period

ot'

t.lme.

At.

t.he

end

or

such

specified ttme, t.he accumulated point.a

were redeemed by persons connected
with the customer accounts for prizes

and gifts selected from a gift catalog

supplied by the sponsoring packer.
(bl Investigation by the Packers and
Stockyards Administration has dis·
closed that sales promotion programs
of the type In question, which are
based on the giving of gifts to retail
food store customer accounts or to the
employees or agents of such customer
accounts, constitute a marketing prac·
Uce under which sellers tend to compete In the sale of their products on
the basis of Inducements offered to
their customers In the form of personal gifts, rather than on the basis of
the merits and prices of the competing
products, and may result In <1 > the
lessening of competition by unduly
hamperlnt1 sales of competing products, and <21 the making or giving of
undue or unreasonable preferences or
dvantages.
<c> It Is the view of the Packers and
Stockyards Administration that sales
promotion programs, which are found
In fact to produce any of the enumer·
ated or similar results, constitute violations of section 202 of the Packers
and Stockyards Act <1 U.S.C. 192>. and
that packers subject to the Act should
voluntarily discontinue sponsoring or
conducting any such program. In the
future, If any packer sponsors or conducts a sales promotion program of
the type In question, consideration will
be given by the Packers and Stockyards Administration to the Issuance
of a complaint charging the packer
with violation of section 202 of the
Act. In the formal administrative proceeding Initiated by any such complaint, the Judicial Officer of the De·
partment will determine, after full
hearing, whether the packer has violated the Act and should be ordered to
cease and desist from continuing such
violation.

t:

1

CSeca. 202, t01; t2 Stat. 169; 1 u.s.c. 192,
228)
121 FR 1125t, Nov. 15. 1962; 21 FR 115t1,
Nov. 2t, 1962, u amended at 32 FR 1100,
May 26. 19611

---···-- -· -- ·- ---·~
kep._ b:y P • c ... e r a .

(Q.)
Sect.ton 4.0l. ol t.he P'll
St.ockyards Act. CJ U.S.C. 221

ln part, that every

pa.c~er

such accounts, records, and
da a.s fully and ~orrectly ¢

transactions Involved In· h1'
Including the true ownersh
business by stockholdlng or
This section contains no p1
to the period of time such r
to be retained. Apparently
templated that records 1
made or kept by a packer
transactions Involved In hi
should be retained for such
time as may be necessary
the Packers and Stockyard
tratlon a reasonable opportu
amine such records In conn<·
Its administration of the Acl
(bl In the course of cone
vestlgatlons under the Act,
ers and Stockyards Division
that the practice varies amoi
with respect to the retenti
for records made or kept t
transactions Involved In thei
some packers retain such r
extended periods of time, w
packers dispose of their rec
much shorter periods of Um
reason the Packers and f
Administration has formu,
adopted for the guidance 01
ers the following statemen1
Ing Its views as to periods of
which certain specified recc
Ing to the purchase or sal
stock, meat, meat food pro<
stock products In unmar
form, poultry or poultry 11r,i
be disposed of.
cc> It Is the view of the p,
Stockyards Administration
forth In paragraphs cc> Cll,,
of this section, are reason•
of time after which packer.
the provisions of th~
Stockyards Act. ma} cl:
records specified ir. 'graphs. The Packers an J
Administration recognize.,
packers do not find i• "'
make or keep all such recott
to comply with the provlsio,
of the Act. On the other
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of

Jambs

at

$21.

provided that
not Jn excess

per

hundredweight..

the average weJght ls
105 pounds, but re-

ot

quJres a discount of the $21 per hundredweJght price at the rate of 25
cents for each pound in excess of the
105 pounds. ThJs type of buying practJce results Jn the final sales price

being made subject to a contingency
based upon average weight. Where the
weight is above the specified weight,
the purchase price is not definite at
the time the agreement to purchase is
entered Into, the discount to be applied is unknown until the lambs are
weighed. and the final sales price,
upon which payment to the lamb pro·
ducer ts based. can only be ascertained
by weighing the lambs to the buyer. It
ts believed that this buying practice
should be discontinued. This method
of buying lends Itself to unfair and deceptlve practices under the Act since It
has the tendency to mislead the producer with respect to the final sales
price and can be used by a buyer to
force a producer to take an unwarranted discount.
ii'~cc.4 ~~~~~'i. ~2 c~\m116 :; 72 Stat. 1750· 7
124 FR 4210. May 26, 1959, as amended at 29
FR 46•5. Apr. l, 196 4; 32 FR 7700 , May 26 ,
19671

§ 203.2 Statement or 1eneral policy with
respect to the giving by meat packen
or meat and other 1irt1 to Government
employees.

<al In recent months, the Depart·
ment has received information, confirmed by investigation, that a number
or packers subject to the Packers and
Stockyards Act have made gifts of
meat to Government employees re·
SiJOnsible tor conducting service activities of the Department. Such gifts
have the Implications of fraud. even if
not made specifically for the purpose
or influencing these employees In the
performance of their duties.
<b> It Is a violation of the Meat In·
spection Act for any person, firm, or
corporation to give to any employee of
the Department performing duties
under such act anything of value with
intent to Influence such employee In

.stat.e

or

t"oreJST>.

commerce

any

Kitt.

gfven wJth any Intent or purpose whatsoever <21 U.S.C. 90>. Under the Feder-

al meat grading regulations, the giving
or attempting to give by a packer of
anything of vaJue t.o any employee of
the Department authorized to perform any function under such regulatlons is a basis for the withdrawal or

Federal meat grading service <7 CFR
53.13>. The receiving by an employee
of the Department or any gift from
any person for whom grading, lnspectlon, or other service work Is performed Is specifically prohibited by
Departmental regulations.
<cl Upon the basis of para11raphs <al
and <bl of this section, It is the view of
the Department that It Is an unfair
and deceptive practice In violation of
section 202<a> of the Packers and
Stockyards Act <7 U.S.C. 192<all for
any person subject to the provisions of
Title II or said Act to give or offer to
give meat, money, or anything of value
to any Government employee who performs Inspection, grading, reporting.I>
or regulatory duties directly relating
to the purchase or sale or livestock or
the preparation or distribution of
meats, meat food products, livestock
products In unmanufactured form,
poultry or poultry products.
<Sec. 407, 42 Stat. 169; 7 U.S.C. 228; 9 CFR
201.3)
126 FR no. Jan. 25, 1961; 29 FR •oa1. Mar.
28. 19641

§ 203.3 Statement with respect lo meal
packer sales promotion programa.

<al During the past several years. a
number or packers subject to the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 192J, as
amended <7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), have
sponsored meat and meat food product
sales promotion programs under
which valuable gifts ranging from articles of clothing to automobiles and
outboard boats and motors have been
offered and given to their retail food
store customer accounts and to the
employees of such customer accounts.
Many of the promotion pro11rams In
question have been based upon a
"point system" whereby so-called
"participating customer accounts"

IJ
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~<.h.-orlz.c

such

a.

n.

n<><.

repre3en<.a.<.IV<:'"

check;

or

for

<.-o

ot.he.-

""''""I-•
"-<>
r<>c:clvc

res.sons

seller may prefer that such a
purchaser make payment by maUang a

such a

check within the Ume llmit as prescribed in sectJon 409<a> of the Act. In
cases when the seller does not intend

If the seller. ror reasons other than
not belng present to receh.!e payment.
prefers to have the packer. market

agency. or dealer make payment by

ot transfer of possession of livestock sold by

malling a check within the time limit
as provided In section 409(a), he may
use the above form but st.ul!ld not Include the statement In the first sentence that he does not Intend to be
present.

-This does not constitute an extension of

<Sec. tOl, 42 Slat. 188 17 U.S.C 221); sec. 407,
42 Stat. 180 11 U.S.C. 228>; sec. 400, as added
~Y sec. 1, 90 Slat. 1250 ,7 U.S.C. 228bl; 1
CFR 2.11. 2.M; U FR 35825>
IU FR 40020, Sept. 28, 19711

to be present, he may use the following form of notl!lcatlon to the purchaser:
I do not tntend to be present at the point

me to <name of packer, market agency, or
dealer) tor the purpose of recelvinK a check
In payment for such Uvestock.
I hereby direct <name of packer, market
aeency, or dealer) to make payment tor livestock purchased fl-om me, by mallln111 a
check for the full amount of the purchase
price before the close of the next business
day following the purchase of livestock and
transfer of possession thereof or, in the cue
of a purchase on a "carcass" or "arade and
yl~ld" ba.sls, not later than the close of the
first business day followln111 determination
of the purchase price.

(b) The Packers and Stockyards Administration believes that such an
agreement would not constitute an extension of credit within the meaning
of section 206 of the Act because It
would not give the purchaser any
more time to Issue a check than ls provided In section 409<a>.

c
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mannerII Cu.1torne..-·.1 l1abi/1i11. A

cual.omer. eub-

Ject to tho:- Packers JUld St.ockya.rd.s Act. who
knows. or- should know. that he la receJvtne
payment.s or servJces which a.re nol avail&·

ble on proportlonaJJy eQuaJ tenna to hl.s
competitors en11aged 1n lhe resaJe ol the
i;ame packer"!> products may be In vlolatJon

ot the provtslons ot the Act. Also, customent
<subject lo lhe Packers and Stockyardii Act>
that make unauthorized deductions from
;>Lirchase Invoices for alleged advertlslns or
other promotional allowances may be proct>eded agalnst under the provisions of the
Act.
Example l: A customer subject to the Act
should not Induce or receive an allowance In
excess of that ortered In the packer's advertislrur plan by bllllnK the packer at "vendor
rates" or for any other a.mount In excess of
that authorized In the packer's promotion
proitram.
12. Muting com~tilion. A packer chanred
with discrlminallon under the provisions of
lhe Packen and Stockyards Act may defend
hls aclloOli by showJns that the payments
were made or the services were furnished In
KQOd faith to meet equally high payments
made by a competln1 packer to the parUcular customer. or to meet equivalent services
furnished by a competlna pa.cker to the parUcular customer. Thia defense. however, la
subJect t.o Important limitations. For Instance, It ls lnsurticlent t.o defend solely on
the basis that competition Jn a particular
market ls very keen, requlrin1 that special
Mllowances be 1tven to some customer& lf a
packer la "lo be competitive."
13. Coal Jwl\licalion. It ta no defense to a
charae of unlawful discrimination In the
payn1ent of an allowance or the furnlshln1
of a 1ervlce for a packer to show that such
payment or service could be Justlfled
throu1h savlnKs In the cost of manufacture.
&ale. or dellvery.
The fore1oln1 are ruldellnes which set
forth the seneral views of the Packen and
Stockyards Admlnlatratlon re1ardlnK advertlslnK allowancCa and other merchandlslna
payment.a and aervlcea. In a particular situation In which the Administrator believes
that the Act haa been violated In connection
with such activities, a complaint may be

Issued lnstltullnK a formal administrative
proceedln1 under the Act. In such a pro-

ccedln1. the Adrnlnlst.rallve Law Judie or

the Judicial O!llcer of the Department wlll

determine, after opportunity for full hear-

lnK. whether the packer bu In fact violated
the Packers and Stockyarcla Act and should
be ordered lo ceue and dealat from continuing: such violation.

72J. J6 lJ.S.C:. 46<11r>.)

(38 FR :U173. Au11. 6.10731

§ 203.15

Tr-ual bendlU

of the Act..

und~r •ecUon

206

<a> Within the times specified under
section 206<bl of the Act, the seller, to
preserve his Interest In the statutory
trust, must give written notice to the
packer and file such notice with the
Secretary. One o! the ways to satisfy
the notification requirement under
this provision ls to make certain that
notice Is given to the packer within
the prescribed time by letter, mall·
gram, or telegram stating:
(I) Notification to preserve trust
benefits;
<2> Identification of packer;
<3> Identification o! seller;
<4) Date o! the transaction;
<5) Date o! seller's receipt o! notice
that payment Instrument has been dis·
honored <If applicable>; and
<6> Amount of money due;
and to make certain that a copy •
such letter, mallgram, or telegram
filed with a P&SA Area Office or wit
P&SA, USDA, Washington, D.C.
20250, within the prescribed time.
<b> While the above Information ts
desirable, any written notice which In·
forms the packer and the Secretary
that the packer has failed to pay for
livestock ls sufficient to meet the
above-mentioned statutory require·
ment If It ts given within the pre·
scribed time.
<Sec. tot, 42 Stat. 188, <1 u.s.c. 221>: sec.
401, 42 Stat. 169, <1 U.S.C 228>: sec. 409, aa
added by aec. 1, 90 Stal. 1250, (1 U.S.C
228bl; 1 CFR U1, 2.54; 42 FR 35625)
I42 FR 49929, Sept. 28, 19111

I 203.16 Malling of checko In payment (or

11......... purchued ror 1laushler. for
cuh and not on crediL
<al The Packers and Stockyards Ad·
ministration recognizes that one who
sells livestock to a packer, market
agency, or dealer, who ts purchasing
for slaughter, may not Intend to be
present at the point of transfer of p o .
session of the livestock, to receive pa
'
ment, at the time a check In paymen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Served the foregoing Brief of Respondent by mailing copies
thereof to Attorneys for Appellants, this 9th day of November,
1981.

Craig s. Cook
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
and
Richard Stein
Richard Campbell
Stein & Campbell
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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